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ABSTRACT 
 
Hepatitis A virus (HAV) is one of the potential hazards to public health.  Although it is 
relatively harmless, it may cause high expenses for medical treatment and loss of productivity. 
Further concern is the ability of HAV in causing outbreaks which can affect large population. 
It is because HAV has various routes of transmission. The most common route of HAV 
transmission is by faecal-oral route. However, it can be transmitted through close person to 
person contact or contact with inanimate objects. The other transmissions are among men 
having sex with men (MSM), injecting drug use and via contaminated food and water which is 
less common. Although it is less common, foodborne transmission can spread the infection to 
a wider area. Foodborne transmission can lead into a global problem because many food 
products are exported around the world. 
The best way to prevent an outbreak is rapid detection of the infection source. The most 
common method for identifying detect the source is doing epidemiology and trace-back 
investigation. However, it is difficult to use this method for food borne transmission because 
HAV has a long incubation period. Therefore, by the time the symptoms occur, the patients 
might not remember what they have eaten. Furthermore, the contaminated food might have 
been thrown away, so it would be impossible to isolate the virus from the suspected food. One 
of the effective tools to rapidly confirm the investigation is doing sequencing characterization. 
It is done by sequence the HAV and compares it with the available sequences from the previous 
cases. 
The current research project genotyped HAV RNA by using protocols and primer sets designed 
by HAVNET. It collected and genotyped previous HAV-positive samples in VIDRL sample 
bank, and the results were used to establish epidemiological and molecular database of the 
HAV strains. The database was used to investigate the relationship between the current 
diagnostic samples and the previous HAV infection cases. It was expected to identify the source 
of the hepatitis A infection. The project was divided into part A and part B; part A 
retrospectively genotyped the HAV RNA positive samples collected from VIDRL sample 
bank, and part B prospectively genotyped current diagnostic samples and compared the result 
against the database. 
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One hundred and forty four samples were collected during part A with 130 samples were nested 
RT-PCR positive. These positive samples were sequenced, and the results showed 71 samples 
genotype IA, 37 IB and 22 IIIA. They were grouped into 24 clusters by the Geneious R7. The 
two largest clusters were the 2009 semi-dried tomato outbreak and the 2015 frozen berries 
outbreak, which consisted of 19 and 17 sequences respectively. Meanwhile, the other 22 
clusters only have two to three sequences and consisted of cases which were geographically 
related, among family members and close contact and patients with travel history to HAV 
endemic countries. 
In part B, there were 195 samples with 188 were positive in the nested RT-PCR assay. The 
comparison between the sequences and the database identified five samples received in 2017 
showed 100% identity to the index case of the 2015 frozen berries outbreak. These findings led 
to a health alert issued by the DHHS along with a product recall of the frozen berries. It was 
suspected that the frozen berries came from the same plant and area and in the same time frame 
as the berries associated with the 2015 frozen berries outbreak. Another notable finding was 
the identification of HAV outbreaks related to HAV outbreaks associated to MSM group in 
Europe. A total of 66 samples were identified among Australian which consisted of three 
different clusters. Genetic analysis found that cases in Cluster 1 were related but not identical 
with the European case. Most cases had two nucleotide differences with the index case from 
Europe. Meanwhile, cases in Cluster 2 and 3 were identical with the Europe index case of each 
cluster. These findings also led to a health alert issued by the DHHS. Besides those two major 
clusters, there were several smaller clusters identified during part B. These clusters consisted 
of families and their close contact, and among patients with travel history to HAV endemic 
countries. 
The project showed that molecular investigation has a critical role in investigating the source 
of HAV infection. It should be used to support the epidemiological approaches, especially 
during HAV outbreak investigation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Hepatitis 
 
1.1.1. Introduction 
Hepatitis viruses are important human pathogens that were clinically defined according to their 
capacity to induce jaundice. The first attributed description of jaundice can be found in Sumeria 
on clay tablets that described the clinical features of epidemic jaundice.1 Other reports of 
epidemic jaundice were also provided by the Greeks and Romans but with fewer details than 
that supplied by the Sumerians.1,2 The first use of the word icterus can be found in the 
Hippocratic Corpus.1 
Hepatitis is an inflammatory disease of the liver which can have several causes. Although most 
cases are caused by hepatitis viruses, hepatitis can also be caused by infection from other 
pathogens, autoimmune diseases and chemical substances (e.g. alcohol and paracetamol). 
Clinical manifestations can vary from asymptomatic acute self-limiting disease to chronicity 
progressing to more severe illnesses, such as cirrhosis, hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) or even 
death due to liver failure. These clinical manifestations may depend on the etiological agent of 
hepatitis.3 
The five hepatitis viruses, designated A – E, cause major health problems in communities and 
economic burdens on health systems.4 While infection with any of these viruses can lead to the 
classic hepatitis symptoms of dark urine, yellowing of the eyes and skin (jaundice) and 
anorexia, the viruses are otherwise unrelated, employing different replication strategies which 
divides them into separate taxonomic families. They cause significant morbidity and mortality 
in human populations both from acute infection and their chronic sequelae.5 Worldwide, there 
are 240 million people chronically infected with hepatitis B virus (HBV) and 130-150 million 
with chronic hepatitis C virus (HCV) infections. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
estimates that less than 5% of people with chronic hepatitis infection are aware of their status. 
This is largely due to the lack of access to simple and effective hepatitis diagnostic testing 
strategies and tools.4 The Global Burden of Disease Study 2010 estimated that the total number 
of deaths attributable to HBV infection was 786,000 and when combined with 499,000 deaths 
from HCV infection, viral hepatitis ranks as one of the most frequent causes of human 
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mortality. Of those chronically infected individuals, approximately 25% will develop liver 
cancer which is the fifth most common cancer worldwide, ranking third as a cause of cancer 
mortality.6 The presence of HIV infection has also contributed to an increase in viral hepatitis 
mortality. There are an estimated 2.9 million people with HIV with hepatitis C co-infection 
and 2.6 million with hepatitis B co-infection.4  
Hepatitis has been largely ignored as a health priority. Many countries and international 
communities have not undertaken programs to eliminate hepatitis virus epidemics. National 
and regional data are often insufficient and hepatitis surveillance programs have often been 
ineffective because of difficulties in planning specific actions and prioritizing the allocation of 
resources. Although vaccination programs have been implemented in many countries, coverage 
of prevention programs for specific populations at risk has been limited. Despite the reduction 
of 91% in hepatitis B infections and 83% in hepatitis C, unsafe medical injections still cause 
1.7 million new hepatitis B cases and between 157,000 and 315,000 new HCV infections 
annually. Moreover, global coverage of harm reduction programs for people who inject drugs 
is less than 10%. Although by 2014 global childhood hepatitis B vaccination coverage had 
increased to over 82%, the critically important coverage of hepatitis B birth-dose vaccination 
lagged behind, at just 38%.4 
 
1.1.2. Hepatitis Viruses 
According to historical classification, there were two distinct types of hepatitis identified, 
infectious hepatitis and serum hepatitis. This classification was based on distinctive 
epidemiological, clinical and immunological differences. Infectious hepatitis, which later 
became known as hepatitis A, had a 2 – 6 weeks incubation period and was spread by the 
faecal-oral route. It was considered highly infectious and occurred in large common-source 
outbreaks. Meanwhile, serum hepatitis, later known as hepatitis B, had a longer incubation 
period, on average 2-3 months. It was associated with percutaneous inoculation of blood or 
instruments contaminated with blood. Furthermore, it was not spread as readily from person to 
person. However, the discoveries of virus antigens, animal models and development of 
serological tests have radically changed these traditional concepts and broadened our 
understanding of the causes of viral hepatitis.7 
Currently, there are five viruses known to cause hepatitis for which the liver is the main target 
organ.3 These are designated hepatitis A, B, C, D and E viruses.3 The hepatitis viruses can be 
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different in their mode of transmission, in some of their clinical manifestations and they can 
affect different populations. Therefore, control requires a specific intervention for each of the 
respective viruses.4 The viruses can be divided into the enterically transmitted hepatitis agents 
(hepatitis A virus (HAV) and hepatitis E virus (HEV)) and parenterally transmitted hepatitis 
agents (HBV, HCV and hepatitis D virus (HDV)).8 In areas of high hepatitis B endemicity, 
transmission from chronically infected mother-to-baby (believed to be by contact with infected 
blood or body fluids during birth) is the most common route of infection. Most babies infected 
neonatally will also become chronically infected and perpetuate the cycle of HBV transmission. 
In low prevalence areas, HBV transmission occurs more commonly in young adults through 
unsafe injecting practices and through sexual contact.9 HCV is endemic in many countries and 
transmission has been linked to poor medical practices, including unsafe iatrogenic procedures 
and transfusion using unscreened blood products. In most developed countries, the major risk 
factor is injecting drug use.10 HDV infects around 10-20 million people worldwide. It is a small, 
incomplete single stranded RNA virus that requires the HBV surface antigen (HBsAg) for its 
assembly and replication. Infection has been associated with more rapid progression to 
cirrhosis, hepatic decompensation, and death than with HBV infection alone. Transmission of 
HDV in endemic areas appears to be through horizontal intra-familial spread, although sexual 
transmission may also play a role. Injecting drug use and unsafe medical practices are also risk 
factors for acquisition, particularly in non-endemic countries.11,12 Hepatitis A and E viruses are 
transmitted via the faecal-oral route and are able to be transmitted through food- and water-
borne infections.4 
Each of these viruses is responsible for different patterns of clinical disease. Whereas hepatitis 
B, C and D infection can develop into chronic and more severe forms of hepatitis,3 infections 
by hepatitis A and E viruses are usually self-limiting and rarely cause severe hepatitis.2,13,14 
However, HAV may cause acute liver failure (fulminant hepatitis) among young children and 
older adults with underlying chronic liver disease.2 HEV has a high fatality rate among patients 
with underlying chronic liver disease and pregnant women.15,16,17 Both HAV and HEV have 
been associated with large scale food and water-borne epidemics.18,19  
 
1.1.3. Hepatitis Virus Infection Symptomology 
Despite the ability of the hepatitis viruses to cause symptomatic hepatitis, many hepatitis 
infections are asymptomatic or cause only mild and non-specific symptoms.3 Symptoms when 
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they occur include fever, malaise, weakness, anorexia, nausea, vomiting, upper abdominal pain 
and dark urine which is followed by increased liver enzyme levels.2,3,8,13,18 After liver enzymes 
increase, infected individuals develop a yellowish colour of their skin and eyes, which is called 
jaundice.3 During this stage, the previous symptoms usually decrease, whereas anorexia, 
malaise and weakness may only slightly increase.2,13 
Physical examination of patients with viral hepatitis usually does not show any abnormality 
prior to the development of jaundice. However, some may have hepatomegaly (10% of the 
patients), splenomegaly (5%) and lymphadenopathy (5%). Few acute viral hepatitis patients 
suffer cholestatic illness, but this is more common among hepatitis A patients. This illness can 
be prolonged and sometimes the patients have jaundice for up to eight months.20  
Acute viral hepatitis may develop into fulminant hepatitis which can lead to death. The 
development of hepatic encephalopathy usually occurs within eight weeks of symptoms or two 
weeks after the jaundice occurs. Acute liver failure is almost always preceded by jaundice. 
However, there is no correlation between the peak of serum alanine transferase and the risk of 
liver failure development. Generally, the risk of fulminant hepatitis development is low, but 
some populations may be at greater risk. For example, pregnant women with hepatitis E 
infection are at risk, with approximately 15% developing acute fulminant hepatitis with a 
mortality of 5%. Meanwhile, acute fulminant hepatitis development among hepatitis A patients 
increases with age and underlying liver disease. Although it is rare, acute fulminant hepatitis B 
can be found in adult patients.20 
Chronic hepatitis is a clinical and pathological syndrome. HBV, HCV and HDV/HBV can all 
be the cause of chronic viral hepatitis. Chronic hepatitis symptoms are usually mild, 
nonspecific and often overlooked. Infection can silently progress to liver cirrhosis without 
symptoms or signs of liver disease. The most common symptom of chronic hepatitis is fatigue 
or malaise, which is usually intermittent. Although less common, nausea, abdominal pain and 
muscle or joint aches may occur. Other typical liver disease symptoms, such as jaundice, dark 
urine, itching, poor appetite and weight loss are rare, unless during severe exacerbations or 
when cirrhosis is present. However, the severity of chronic hepatitis cannot be measured by 
symptoms. The important tool for grading and staging chronic hepatitis required the use of 
histopathology but in some countries, this has been superseded by the use of transient 
elastography.21,22  
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1.2. Hepatitis A Virus 
 
1.2.1. Discovery of Hepatitis A Virus 
The lack of a susceptible animal model limited the studies of enteric hepatitis viruses. In 1967, 
Deinhardt et al.23 successfully transmitted a hepatitis virus from human to marmoset. They 
inoculated samples from patients in the early acute phase of viral hepatitis to five groups of 
marmosets. Two out of five groups developed hepatic disease which was shown biochemically 
by elevation of serum glutamic oxalacetic transaminase (SGOT) and serum isocitric 
dehydrogenase (SICD) levels. Serial liver biopsies showed changes characteristic of human 
viral hepatitis. There remained a possibility that the hepatitis development was caused by 
activation of latent marmoset hepatitis rather than transmission from humans.24 Holmes et al.24 
designed an experiment using plasma from human volunteers who had been inoculated orally 
with a hepatitis agent and subsequently developed clinical disease. The inoculum was shown 
not to contain the newly discovered Australia antigen, later shown to be hepatitis B surface 
antigen. Marmosets received inoculation intravenously, and both inoculated and un-inoculated 
controls were bled weekly to determine SGOT and SCID levels. They also had percutaneous 
liver biopsies every two weeks. Only inoculated marmosets developed hepatitis which was 
confirmed by biochemical assays and liver biopsy.1,24 This disease was later confirmed to be 
hepatitis A and the causative agent, HAV. 
In 1973 Feinstone et al.25 identified an agent in stool specimens by immune-electron 
microscopy. The stool specimens were obtained before inoculation or during acute illness from 
four adult volunteers who were inoculated either orally or parenterally with infectious hepatitis 
extracts. They discovered virus-like particles approximately 27 nanometres (nm) in diameter 
in two out of four stools specimen which were not found before the virus inoculation.25 Soon 
after, Locarnini et al.26 were able to identify morphologically identical particles in naturally 
acquired, sporadic hepatitis A from patient stool specimens in Melbourne. Similar 27 nm virus-
like particles were visualized from eight out of nine hepatitis A patient samples during the acute 
phase of their illness. This particle was not found in stools from three patients with acute 
hepatitis B infection nor in stools from nine patients without hepatitis.26 The discovery of HAV 
led to the further development of diagnostic assays, molecular characterization and a successful 
vaccine.2  
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1.2.2. Epidemiology 
Hepatitis A infections occur in all countries, and approximately 1.5 million clinical cases occur 
annually. The rate of infection is probably at least ten times higher, because most cases are 
asymptomatic. The incidence rate has a close relationship with socioeconomic indicators and 
access to safe drinking water. It decreases as incomes rise and with better access to clean 
water.18,27 Most cases occur in regions with low standards of hygiene, giving rise to increased 
rates of transmission.8,18  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Seroprevalence of hepatitis A virus.28  
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia have high HAV seroprevalence rates. Latin 
America, North Africa and Middle East show intermediate seroprevalence rates. Low 
seroprevalence rates are found mostly in Asia, South East Asia, and Eastern Europe. 
North America, Western Europe and Australia are high income countries and have very 
low seroprevalence rates.2,28 
 
In less developed countries, HAV infection is highly endemic, and most infections occur in 
early childhood.2,18,19 Infections in early childhood tend to be asymptomatic; reported rates of 
the disease are low, and outbreaks are uncommon. The contributing factors to HAV 
transmission in these countries are household crowding, poor levels of sanitation and 
inadequate water supplies. In developing countries, the infections usually occur in late 
childhood and adolescence. Consequently, most cases will be symptomatic and the reported 
rates of hepatitis A infection can be higher than in less developed countries.18  
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1.2.3. Hepatitis A Virus Genome 
HAV is a non-enveloped RNA virus with an icosahedral symmetry.2 The virion is 27 to 29 nm 
in diameter which is consistent with members of the family Picornaviridae.2,29 The HAV 
genome consists of a linear piece of single-stranded, positive-sense RNA, 7.5 kb in length and 
it contains a polyadenylate (poly A) tail.30,31 HAV RNA has a similar structure to other 
picornaviruses which consists of a 5’ noncoding region (NCR), a coding region and a 3’ 
NCR.2,32 The 5’ NCR has an internal ribosome entry site, important in translation initiation.  
 
1.2.4. Hepatitis A Proteins 
HAV has four putative capsid proteins which are designated VP1, VP2, VP3, and VP4. The 
polypeptides have molecular weights of 32 to 33 kilodaltons (kd) (VP1), 26 to 29 kd (VP2), 22 
to 27 (VP3) and 10 to 14 kd (VP4).33 VP1, VP2, and VP3 are the major proteins of the hepatitis 
A viral capsid. The minor protein, VP4 is essential for virion formation. Whether the small 
VP4 protein is a component of the HAV capsid is still not known.2,32 The P2 and P3 regions of 
the HAV genome have a function in encoding non-structural proteins and are predicted to 
function in RNA synthesis and virion formation. Another function of the P3 region is encoding 
VPg (virion protein, genome linked), which is linked to the 5’ genome terminus and is involved 
in RNA synthesis initiation.2,32  
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Figure 1.2 Schematic representation of hepatitis A virus genome organization.  
The P1 region encodes the major proteins of the viral capsid, VP1, VP2, and VP3. VP4 is 
essential for virion formation and not detected in mature viral particles.32 The P2 and P3 
regions encode non-structural proteins which are involved in RNA synthesis and virion 
formation.32 The subgenomic regions commonly used for PCR amplification encode: (1) 
The C-terminus of VP3, (2) the N-terminus of VP1, (3) the entire VP1 region, (4) the 
VP1/P2A junction, (5) the VP1/P2B region and (6) the VP3/P2B region.2 
 
1.2.5. Hepatitis A Virus Classification 
HAV has many characteristics of the picornaviruses. It has an icosahedral symmetry with no 
virus-encoded lipid envelope. The virus capsid is comprised of 60 copies of each of three major 
proteins VP1, VP2 and VP3 and possibly a fourth minor structural protein, VP4, which is 
present on the structural polypeptide. Other picornaviral properties of HAV are its single-
stranded, positive-sense RNA genome with 5’ genome-linked protein and 3’ terminal poly A 
tail.34 During the early 1980s, HAV was classified as an enterovirus within the family 
Picornaviridae. This classification was partly based on its route of transmission which is 
mostly oral-faecal. However, more recent evidence has shown that HAV is significantly 
different to the other members of the Picornaviridae genera. HAV replicates in the liver and 
there is still no definitive evidence of other HAV replication sites. Unlike picornaviruses, its 
replication does not interfere with host cell biosynthetic processes. HAV has a unique capsid 
structure and is more resistant to low pH and high temperature.34,35 Unlike other enteroviruses 
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and rhinoviruses, HAV has only one serotype.33 These findings have led to new classification 
of HAV as a Hepatovirus, a member of the fifth genera of the Picornaviridae.32,34 
 
1.2.6.  Hepatitis A Virus Genotype 
HAV genotype mapping has been performed by sequencing several regions of the genome. 
These regions encode the C terminus of the VP3 protein, the N terminus of the VP1 protein 
and the junctional region of the VP1/2A proteins.36,37,38 HAV genotype characterization was 
first proposed by Jansen et al.39 who compared isolates from volunteers, consisting of hepatitis 
A patients in Kansas USA and Germany, using cell culture-adapted HAV from an owl monkey 
and cell culture isolates from the WHO Program for Vaccine Development.13,39 They amplified 
the highly conserved region encoding the carboxyl terminus of the VP3 and the less conserved 
region encoding the carboxyl terminus of VP1 and the amino terminus of protein 2A. The study 
showed that most HAV strains shared a high degree of nucleotide identity (>92%). However, 
there were large differences between two strains which were recovered from different 
epidemiologic sources. They differed by up to 14% in the VP3 region and 24% in the VP1/2A 
region. Furthermore, the study also identified two genetically related strains which were 
isolated from patients in Kansas and from an outbreak in Germany. The data showed that there 
was an epidemiologic link between geographically unrelated patients which was previously 
unrecognized.39 
A 1992 study differentiated seven major genotypes of HAV. Over 170 samples were collected 
from a variety of sources, including individual virus isolates or clinical specimens and virus 
from the WHO Program for Vaccine Development. The study sequenced the VP1/2A 
junctional region and revealed that HAV can be differentiated into seven major genotypes (I-
VII). HAV from Genotypes I, II, III, and VII were isolated from human hepatitis A cases, while 
Genotypes IV to VI were recovered from simian species. However, Genotype III is a unique 
genotype, because it was retrieved from both human and non-human primate hosts. Each of 
these main genotypes were further divided into sub-genotypes A and B, which differed from 
each other by 7.5% in nucleotide divergence.36 The study indicated that strains isolated from 
some geographical regions belonged to a common genotype, while those from other regions 
were different and probably belonged to imported genotypes. The data supported previous 
findings by Jansen et al.39 that molecular investigations can recognize epidemiologic links 
between cases from different geographical regions.36,39 
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Robertson et al.36 mapped the distribution of HAV strains using molecular data. There were 82 
Genotype I viruses of the 104 (80%) human samples which they studied. Furthermore, 
Subgenotype IA was the most common of the human strains (69 of 104 samples (67%)) in 
samples from North and South America, China, Japan, the former USSR and Thailand. Three 
related clusters with closely related sequences were found in samples from other regions. These 
included one strain from the USA. another from Japan, and a third group from Japan and China. 
Subgenotype IB contained strains from Jordan, North Africa, Australia, Europe, Japan and 
South America, with the majority of these strains being isolated from locations near the 
Mediterranean.36 
Twelve years after the Robertson study, another study revealed a close relationship between 
Genotypes II and VII. Lu et al.,38 after sequencing the regions encoding VP3 and the VP1/2A 
junctional of a cell culture isolate, CF53/Berne, was classified as Genotype II. Furthermore, 
they did pairwise comparisons between the CF53/Berne strain, and other complete HAV 
genomic sequences. They showed that the Genotype II strain was most closely related to the 
single Genotype VII strain, SLF88. This was confirmed by phylogenetic analysis of other 
genomic regions. Their data showed that CF53/Berne and SLF88 isolates are more closely 
related to each other than Subtypes IA and IB. Therefore, Genotypes II and VII are now 
considered as two subgenotypes (IIA and IIB) of Genotype II.13,38  
 
1.2.7. Pathogenesis   
The most common infection pathway of HAV is the faecal-oral route. In an earlier study, viral 
antigen was detected by immunofluorescence in the stomach, small intestine and large intestine 
of owl monkeys which were infected by human HAV. Virus was detected both after the initial 
oral inoculation and later in the course of the disease.32 Hepatitis A virions probably reach the 
liver through the portal blood flow and are then taken up by hepatocytes. HAV replicates in 
hepatocytes and is released into the bile and shed in stools. This enterohepatic cycle of 
gastrointestinal uptake and liver transfer continues until neutralized by antibodies which 
interrupt the cycle.32 
HAV replication in hepatocytes causes liver dysfunction. It triggers immune responses which 
cause liver inflammation.40 However, the clinical manifestations of HAV infection vary with 
age. Infections among children are usually asymptomatic or mild, while adults mostly develop 
jaundice and other symptoms.2,18,19,40,41 Furthermore, among older adults with underlying liver 
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disease, the infection can cause fulminant hepatitis.2 However, clearance of infection will lead 
to lifelong immunity against re-infection,41 which is why in highly endemic countries most 
people acquire infection during childhood and outbreaks of symptomatic HAV infection rarely 
occur. However, in low endemic countries adults are more vulnerable to infection, and 
symptomatic outbreaks occur more frequently.18,41 
 
1.2.8. Routes of Transmission 
Transmission of HAV mostly occurs by the faecal-oral route.8,13,40 Studies  have shown that 
virus particles are excreted during clinical illness from 3 and up to 11 months after infection, 
based on HAV RNA testing by Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR).32 
Most infections occur is households and after close contact with an infected person.2,40 
However, other routes of transmission are possible and include anal-oral sexual practices, 
injecting drug use and transfusion of contaminated blood or blood products.11,18 Transmission 
following the consumption of contaminated food or water occurs less frequently but can be 
associated with large outbreaks.2,3,40 
HAV is able to survive for long periods on human hands and inanimate objects. A study by 
Mbithi et al.42 showed that 32% of HAV remained infectious on finger pads after 4 h. HAV 
contamination of human hands is responsible for transmission to others and may cause 
infection.42 Therefore, it can be easily transmitted by personal contact. Infected children are 
most likely to be the unidentified source of HAV infection in their household, because of the 
asymptomatic nature of the illness and possible use of less scrupulous hygiene practices.32 This 
study also showed that HAV can be transmitted from finger pads to inanimate surfaces. 
Contaminated surfaces have a higher ability to transfer HAV when it wet and decrease as the 
virus dries. During the drying process some viruses are usually inactivated.42 Mbithi et al.43 in 
a previous study discovered that HAV survived better than poliovirus on nonporous inanimate 
surfaces. 
Transmission comes from close contact with an infected family member in about 25% of 
infections.2,19 About 40-50 % of reported cases have no identifiable source of infection. 
However, this is probably due to personal contact with unidentified infected person(s) who 
shed HAV. A study in Salt Lake City, Utah showed that 25% of the hepatitis A infections from 
unknown sources were due to household contacts with serologic evidence of a recent hepatitis 
A infection.19 Another study in Almaty, Kazakhstan, indicated that households were the major 
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foci of transmission. The probability of household contacts getting infected was 35.4 times than 
that of day-care/school contacts. Households support person-to-person contact by providing 
the required close contact, and households with young children are important loci of infection 
in many parts of the world. The presence of a younger age raised the odds of household contacts 
becoming infected. Among households with a case under 6 years, the odds increased 7.7 times, 
while for contacts 7 to 13 years old, the odds were 7.0 times compared with an infected adult.44 
Children tend to be potential unidentified sources of infection. They have the highest incidence 
of infection and are usually asymptomatic. Furthermore, they excrete virus for longer than 
adults, although further confirmatory studies are required.19 A study of an outbreak among the 
Hasidic Jewish community in New York identified that the highest attack rate was among 3-5 
year old. The survey showed that the presence of a 3-5 year old child was the only risk factor 
that raised the risk of hepatitis A infection.45 Another study of an outbreak in Florida identified 
day-care centres as the important source of hepatitis A infections and showed that 37% of the 
311 cases were related to day-care centres.46 
Prospective studies have shown that men who have sex with men (MSM) have a high incidence 
of HAV infection.2,13,19 MSM activity may lead to faecal-oral spread of HAV through oral-anal 
contact. Such outbreaks have occurred in the US and Europe.2 HAV isolates with identical 
nucleotide sequences have been observed during these outbreaks and also from other outbreaks 
in different locations.19 Recently, large hepatitis A outbreaks have occurred among European 
Union (EU) Countries. Most of the affected patients were self-identified as MSM. The 
outbreaks started in late 2016 with three clusters identified. As of June 2017, there were 1500 
confirmed cases from 16 EU countries. Molecular investigations showed that each cluster was 
caused by separate strains of HAV Genotype IA.47 
Injecting drug users are also at high risk of hepatitis A infection, and outbreaks have been 
reported in North America and Scandinavia.2,13,19 Routes of transmission among this group are 
likely to have been caused by a combination of person-to-person contact and percutaneous 
entry by needle sharing. Infected injecting drug users are a potential source of infection for 
non-drug using personal contacts. This pattern was shown in an outbreak among 
methamphetamine users and their contacts during 2001 and 2002 in Polk County, Florida. 
However, this pattern has been questioned, as some patients may have been unwilling to admit 
to illicit drug use. Nevertheless, sequence analysis has shown the same or similar identity 
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between cases. Studies in Scandinavia showed a contrasting result, where strains among 
infected injecting drug users were significantly different than among infected non-drug users.19 
Nosocomial infection caused by HAV has been recognised and can lead to multiple infections. 
Blood products have been implicated in the transmission of HAV to haemophiliacs 48 and to 
recipients after standard blood transfusion.49 Less common sources are contact with an older 
child or adult experiencing vomiting, diarrhoea or faecal incontinence.50 Transmission has been 
reported in hospitals.  In 1987, a paper reported that six nurses and a junior doctor of the 
paediatric intensive care unit at The New York Hospital had developed hepatitis A. The 
suspected source was a 13 year-old boy with metastatic glioma who was faecally incontinent. 
Two additional cases included the husband of one of the nurses and the sister of another nurse. 
Another case, the cousin of an infected nurse, was identified later and considered to be a 
secondary case.51 Another report of nosocomial hepatitis A transmission was published by 
Doebbeling et al.50 They reported a nosocomial HAV outbreak which affected 11 health care 
workers and one patient at the burns treatment centre of a referral hospital. The sources of 
infection were a 32 year old man and his 8-month old son, who were both patients in the burns 
centre and shown retrospectively to be IgM anti-HAV positive.50 
 
1.2.9. Hepatitis A Virus Food Outbreaks 
HAV is known as the second most common viral foodborne disease.14 Transmission via 
contaminated food and water can cause outbreaks which will affect larger populations, but it is 
often occurs too late to allow identification of the source.2,18 As HAV has an incubation period 
of around four weeks,  by the time any cases arise, the contaminated food may have been 
consumed or discarded.2,14,52 Furthermore, investigations using food consumption 
questionnaires are often not dependable due to recall unreliability.13 Therefore, it is difficult to 
define whether the outbreak was caused by contaminated food or from other sources of 
infection.2,14,52 
Food and fresh produce may be contaminated at any time pre- or post-harvest. Pre-harvest 
contaminations may come from irrigation using contaminated water or fertilisation using 
contaminated human bio-solids. Additionally, post-harvest contamination usually comes from 
the hands of infected pickers or food processors, or contaminated surfaces. HAV can be 
transmitted by infected food handlers in restaurants. Raw and lightly cooked foods, such as 
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shellfish, fruits, vegetables and salads are a higher risk for transmitting HAV. However, well-
cooked foods may also transmit HAV, if they are contaminated after cooking.53   
 
1.3. Study Rationale 
 
1.3.1. Hepatitis A 
 
1.3.1.1. The consequences of hepatitis A virus infection 
The case-fatality rate for fulminant hepatitis A is low, being responsible for a 0.1% mortality 
rate among children less than 15 years old, 0.3% for adults aged 15-39 and 2.1% for those aged 
40 and more.40 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that 100 
persons die as result of acute liver failure caused by hepatitis A in the USA annually.54 
Although most hepatitis A patients fully recover, the cost to the community is high. Hepatitis 
A patients may need hospitalization from several days to weeks which leads to absenteeism 
from school or places of employment for long periods of time.40 CDC estimates that in the 
USA HAV infections cost more than $200 million annually. Average costs range from $1,817 
to $2,459 for each adult case as direct and indirect expenses while for children the cost is $433 
to $1,492. Infection may also cause an average loss of 27 working days.54 Therefore, HAV 
infections have the potential to incur a high economic burden because of direct medical costs 
and losses in productivity.40 
 
1.3.1.2. Survival of hepatitis A virus 
The ability of HAV to survive in the environment and contaminated food is intrinsic to its 
transmission. McCaustland et al.55 showed that HAV can survive and remain infectious in dried 
human faeces stored at 25oC for 30 days. Therefore, HAV can contaminate plants which use 
human bio-solids as fertilizer. HAV may also enter the food chain via contaminated water 
which is used for irrigation or washing fresh produce. HAV is able to survive in both fresh and 
sea water for long periods of time.56 However, it is difficult to detect in food or water.14  
HAV is very stable with the capacity to retain its infectivity for long periods of time. Studies 
have shown that chilling and freezing have little effect on its infectivity in fresh produce.56 
Additionally, HAV survival under conditions of chilling is greater than at room temperature. 
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For example, storage of spinach leaves at 5.4oC for 4 weeks results in a decrease of only 1 log10 
of the virus titre.57 HAV titres in frozen raspberries, strawberries and parsley generally remain 
the same after 90 days of storage. HAV titres in frozen blueberries and basil were reduced by 
1 log10 after 2 days of storage.
58 Croci et al.59 showed that there was only a slight decrease of 
virus titre on the surface of contaminated lettuce stored at 4o C for 9 days. They also discovered 
that washing does not guarantee a significant reduction in viral contamination.59 Washing with 
cold water showed less than 1.5 log10 virus titre reduction, while washing with warm water was 
not significantly different than with cold water. More significant reductions were obtained by 
washing with chlorinated water. However, HAV was more resistant to all washing treatments 
compared with other enteric viruses, such as noroviruses, rotaviruses and feline caliciviruses.58 
A further study showed that modification of atmospheric conditions did not influence HAV 
survival on the surface of lettuce leaves incubated at 4o C. A slight improvement in viral 
survival was seen in the presence of high CO2 levels at room temperature.
60  
HAV is able to adhere to surfaces, such as copper, stainless steel, polythene and polyvinyl 
chloride. After attachment to one of these surfaces, the virus could not be easily removed and 
can survive for long periods of time.56 HAV survival on stainless steel was inversely 
proportional to the level of relative humidity (RH) and temperature. The half-lives of the virus 
are >7 days at low RH and 5o C and about 2 h at ultrahigh RH and 35o C.43 Generally, it is 
difficult to determine the role of a contaminated environment in the spread of HAV. However, 
the evidence of survivability on solid surfaces suggests that environmental surfaces may be 
potential vehicles or sources of HAV contamination.53  
 
1.3.1.3. Hepatitis A virus and food industries 
Food- and water-borne viruses have been increasingly identified as causes of illness in humans. 
The development of food processing and changes to food consumption patterns have increased 
the worldwide availability of high-risk food. A further possibility is the occurrence of large 
outbreaks due to contamination of food from a single source, such as an infected food handler 
or contamination during the preparation of fresh produce. Norwalk-like caliciviruses and HAV 
are the mostly reported causes of food-borne infections. The burden of illness from HAV may 
increase in developed countries with good hygienic control measures because a decreasing 
population are naturally immune and there is a concurrent increase in the population at risk.61  
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The development of food industries can help the spread of HAV infection. Most food industries 
are multinational and are supplied by products collected from different countries, one or more 
of which may be regions of high endemicity and which are experiencing an HAV outbreak.14,56 
Most foods, except shellfish, are rarely tested for viruses.58 The lack of sensitive and reliable 
methods for microbiological quality control are often insufficient to detect the presence of 
viruses.14,56,58 Therefore, unprocessed foods can be a source of hepatitis A infections which can 
spread over a wide region as a consequence of global marketing systems.14,56 
In the past few decades, food production and especially that of fresh produce, such as fruit and 
vegetables, has grown rapidly. The increase of international trade has resulted in globalized 
distribution of these food products, which increases the risk of spread of HAV and other 
microbial hazards. Fresh produce may be supplied to different retail outlets which have 
different food safety management procedures. For example, retailers and supermarkets have 
certain food safety specifications, auditing and certification requirements, while local markets 
may have minimal or even no regulation. Therefore, some outlets may present greater risks 
from the marketing of contaminated foods. If an outbreak occurs it may be difficult to trace its 
source, because fresh produce may be prepared by several small producers and then collected 
by a single processor or distributor.62 
 
1.3.1.4. Hepatitis A food outbreaks and molecular typing 
Several hepatitis A infections caused by food outbreaks have been reported in the last few 
decades. In 1988, a large hepatitis A infection epidemic occurred in Shanghai, China and was 
triggered by consumption of raw clams. This epidemic involved 300,000 adolescents and 
young adults and caused 47 deaths.2 During 2013, three different foodborne HAV outbreaks 
occurred in Europe and another outbreak was reported in the US. These outbreaks were caused 
by consuming minimally processed fruit and vegetable products, including fresh and frozen 
strawberries, mixed frozen berries and pomegranate seeds. Molecular typing indicated that 
these outbreaks were associated with a certain strain of HAV.41 
Several large hepatitis A foodborne outbreaks have also occurred in Australia. In 1997, there 
were 444 cases of hepatitis A infection which were associated with consumption of oysters 
from Wallis Lake in New South Wales. After a spike in hepatitis A notifications, the NSW 
Department of Health conducted a matched case control study which implicated oysters. These 
cases included 274 reported cases in New South Wales and 170 in other States across Australia. 
 19 
 
An environmental investigation of 63 samples of oysters and 82 sediment samples showed that 
six oyster samples were positive for HAV RNA but only one sediment sample was found to be 
HAV RNA-positive.63 The limitations of the molecular technology at the time meant that strain 
comparisons were not available. In 2008, The Victorian Department of Human Services 
identified a hepatitis A outbreak which was epidemiologically linked to an infected food 
handler of a café in the Melbourne central business district. The investigation showed that the 
food handler had worked at the café during the infectious period. There were 10 cases who 
acquired their illness by consuming contaminated food from the café. Another case was the 
partner of a case who had eaten at the café, who may have been responsible for person-to-
person transmission.64 Another large outbreak occurred in 2009 which was associated with 
semi-dried tomatoes. There were over 300 cases identified during this outbreak and HAV RNA 
was detected in 22 samples of semi-dried tomatoes.65 Meanwhile, one of the most recent 
outbreaks occurred in 2015 and was associated with consumption of a particular brand of frozen 
mixed berries. There were 28 cases that met the reporting case definition throughout Australia, 
13 in QLD, 8 in NSW, 3 in VIC, 2 in WA, 1 in ACT, and 1 in SA. All were traced to 
consumption of the same brand of frozen berries 15-50 days prior to the onset of symptoms.66  
Molecular typing has proven valuable for source tracing investigations during the HAV food-
borne outbreaks. In 2009, a hepatitis A outbreak occurred in Australia and the source of the 
outbreak was contaminated semi-dried tomatoes.65 Based on the results of Donnan et al.,65 
molecular epidemiological investigations in the Netherlands showed that samples from 
infected patients in both The Netherlands and Australia had sequence identity. Epidemiological 
investigations indicated that the infections were related to the import of semi-dried tomatoes 
originating from Turkey. Isolates from The Netherlands matched the sequences from CDC, 
and tests on domestic samples showed that there was a possible cluster in Brooklyn, New York.  
These findings were considered a landmark because they showed that the description of the 
semi-dried tomatoes outbreak in Australia was related to cases in at least two continents.67 
Molecular typing was also used in investigations of a hepatitis A outbreak in Norway. It was 
possible to identify an outbreak strain which confirmed that a berry mix buttermilk cake was 
the source of the outbreak. Furthermore, sequence characterisation was able to detect small 
clusters from outbreaks in Germany. They revealed that the outbreak source in Germany was 
cake that was supplied by the same German company, which was also exported to Norway.68 
Another molecular characterisation study conducted in Italy investigated hepatitis A cases 
during a 2013 European food-borne outbreak. The study identified a unique strain which was 
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responsible for 66.1% of cases. The data also revealed circulation of unrelated strains which 
were both autochthonous and travel-related. Comparison of these strains highlighted minor 
outbreaks and small clusters, most of which were not recognised using traditional of 
epidemiological tools. Further phylogenetic analysis indicated that travel-related cases were 
clustered with reference strains from the same geographical area.41  
 
1.3.2. Recombination Between Hepatitis A Viruses 
RNA viruses have multiple mechanisms to create genetic variation in order to enhance their 
survival. These mechanisms include high mutation rates, high yields and a short replication 
time, depending on the nucleotide sequence of their genome and environmental factors.69 In 
the past two decades, many RNA viruses have shown the ability to exchange genetic material 
and produce a beneficial outcome due to mutations.70 Recombination may allow the exchange 
of genomic regions from different hepatitis A viruses or the rescue of viable genes from mutant 
parental genomes.69 
Genetic exchange has also been shown for HAV and other RNA viruses in cell culture over 
many years.71,72 In 2003, the first recombinant HAV strain from an infected patient was 
reported by Costa-Mattioli and colleagues37. They recovered an isolate of HAV designated 
9F94 and obtained complete sequences spanning the entire capsid coding region. They aligned 
the results with 10 isolates of HAV isolated elsewhere where complete VP1, VP2 and VP3 
sequences were available. The results showed that 9F94 strain was the evolutionary product of 
a recombinant event.70 
 
1.3.3. Hepatitis A Virus Identification  
 
1.3.3.1. Hepatitis A diagnosis 
Diagnosis of hepatitis A infection can be achieved by detection of specific antibodies from 
serologic assays and the detection of HAV RNA by molecular assays. The main organ involved 
in hepatitis infection is the liver and, therefore, liver function tests should be considered in 
screening suspected hepatitis patients. These tests include total bilirubin, alkaline phosphatase, 
serum alanine transaminase (ALT) and aspartate aminotransferase (AST) levels.13 Besides 
these tests, the laboratory work-up should include a complete blood count and measurement of 
 21 
 
prothrombin time. In symptomatic patients, the most frequent laboratory findings are elevations 
of ALT and AST, alkaline phosphatase, and bilirubin. For patients with acute liver failure, there 
are three variables which indicate a poor prognosis and can lead to fulminant hepatic failure. 
Those variables are: age < 11 years or > 40 years; duration of jaundice before the onset of 
encephalopathy of greater than 7 days; serum bilirubin levels > 300 µM/l and prothrombin time 
> 50 s.13 However, these liver function tests alone are unable to distinguish the causative agent 
of the hepatitis. Therefore, specific laboratory assays are required to identify and differentiate 
between the different infectious agents. The most common assay uses serology to detect IgM 
antibodies to HAV (anti-HAV IgM) and this has become the gold standard for the diagnosis of 
acute hepatitis A infection.2,13 However, anti-HAV IgM testing has some deficiencies. 
Serological assays cannot detect hepatitis A infection during the window period and false-
positives can occur in elderly patients. The IgM anti-HAV titre reaches its peak during the 
symptomatic phase which is approximately 4 to 5 weeks after exposure.2,13  
The most sensitive assays are molecular-based tests which detect HAV RNA by RT-PCR.13 
Studies have shown that nested RT-PCR is a clinically effective method to detect HAV 
infection. It has an important role in the diagnostic and screening process during outbreaks, 
because it can detect HAV RNA in blood earlier than antibodies. Hepatitis A viremia occurs 
during the first week after infection.2,13 Furthermore, PCR products generated in the nested RT-
PCR assay can be used as a template for sequencing to determine the genotype of the isolate. 
In an outbreak scenario, genotyping has proven useful for determining genetic relationships 
among HAV isolates.13  
Real-time PCR is the newest technique used for the detection and quantification of HAV. It is 
fast, highly sensitive and the possibility of amplicon contamination is minimised.2,13 A further 
benefit is its capacity to simultaneously analyse large numbers of samples, which is very useful 
for outbreak investigations.13 Real-time PCR is faster, due to its ability for the more sensitive 
detection of amplified products that require fewer amplification cycles and minimal post-PCR 
detection procedures. With real-time PCR, HAV RNA detection and quantification can be 
performed chemically, using fluorescently-labelled probes.2,13  
At present, real-time PCR has been widely used for HAV RNA detection from various samples 
and has proven to be more sensitive than traditional nested RT-PCR. Similar probes and 
primers can be used for different diagnostic applications. This method has been described by 
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de Paula et al. for the quantification of HAV RNA in serum, saliva, faeces, waters and cell 
cultures using the same set of probes and primers.13 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Virological, immunological and biochemical events during hepatitis A 
virus infection.2  
The incubation period ranges from 15 and 50 days when the patient is still 
asymptomatic. However, the virus is already actively replicating and is excreted in 
faeces. The next phase is the prodrome stage which starts several days to a week 
prior to the peak of the ALT rise and the onset of jaundice. The icteric phase starts 
with the onset of dark urine, pale stools and jaundice. The IgM anti-HAV titre peaks 
between 4 and 5 weeks after infection and decline within 3 – 6 months, when the 
IgG anti-HAV titre can still be detectable.13 
 
1.3.3.2. Victorian Infectious Disease Reference Laboratory 
The Victorian Infectious Disease Reference Laboratory (VIDRL) has an in-house protocol for 
detection and genotyping of HAV RNA. Samples are tested using commercial real-time PCR 
assays and HAV RNA-positive samples are further characterized by an in-house PCR and 
sequencing analysis to identify the virus genotype. Sequences are then entered into a database 
and examined to determine any relatedness with other isolates. This in-house protocol amplifies 
the region encoding the Viral Protein 1/Protein 2A (VP1/P2A) junction and the sequence is 
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approximately 260 nucleotides in length. During two recent Australian outbreaks of hepatitis 
A, one associated with semi-dried tomatoes and another with frozen berries, this procedure was 
used to investigate all cases. 
 
1.3.3.3. OzFoodNet 
OzFoodNet is a health network used to enhance the surveillance of foodborne disease in 
Australia. It undertakes surveillance and investigations of foodborne disease in Australia in 
conjunction with Federal, State and Territory jurisdictions. Recently, a network of Australian 
epidemiologists based in each State and Territory Health Department together with laboratory 
scientists, met under the auspices of OzFoodNet to discuss the enhanced surveillance of 
foodborne disease. Among the agents discussed was HAV. It was decided that laboratories 
involved in testing HAV in Australia should adopt the protocols set out by international 
Hepatitis A Virus Network (HAVNET), a global network of reference laboratories specifically 
focused on HAV. The HAVNET protocol uses a primer set which amplifies a larger portion of 
the genome encoding the VP1/P2A junction. The primer sequence amplifies a region 
approximately 500 nucleotides in length. The HAVNET also has a worldwide standardized 
protocol for HAV identification. One of the aims of HAVNET is to map the worldwide 
distribution of HAV strains which is an important tool for source tracing investigations in 
international food borne outbreaks.73 
 
1.4. Project Method 
VIDRL has a large collection of HAV RNA-positive samples stored at -70°C. HAV in these 
samples was detected after being amplified using the VP1/P2A junction PCR primers which 
amplify a shorter region than the HAVNET PCR primers. This project was designed to fit into 
the objectives of OzFoodNet and HAVNET. It collected samples previously identified as being 
HAV RNA-positive from the VIDRL sample bank and re-tested them using the HAVNET PCR 
primers. Samples shown to be positive by the HAVNET protocol were sequenced and HAV 
genotypes compared with the results obtained from the previous genotyping procedure. 
The project was divided into Part A and Part B. Part A of the project involved retrospectively 
amplifying HAV RNA using HAVNET primers from samples previously identified as being 
HAV RNA-positive from the VIDRL sample bank. Samples underwent RNA extraction before 
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RT-PCR amplification. Testing followed parts of the VIDRL protocol with the HAVNET 
primer set being substituted for the original primers used.  Samples with HAV RNA-positive 
results were sequenced using the Sanger method. Sequences were then analysed to identify 
their genotype and compiled into a VIDRL customised molecular and epidemiological 
database. 
Part B of the project involved prospectively testing patient serum samples which were received 
by VIDRL for investigation of their HAV status. In this part of the project, samples which were 
HAV RNA-positive by the RealStar assay (Altona Diagnostics, Germany), a commercially 
available real-time PCR based assay. These were amplified using the HAVNET PCR primers. 
The positive nested RT-PCR products were sequenced, and genotype identified using the Basic 
Local Alignment Search Tool (BLAST) algorithm against nucleotide sequences within the 
GenBank database. During the BLAST analysis, the sequences were tested against HAV 
sequences in the molecular database to identify the relationship with the previous hepatitis A 
isolates.   
 
1.5. Project Hypotheses, Aims and Objectives 
Hypothesis 1. Retrospective HAV genotyping using the HAVNET primers will confirm the 
initial HAV genotype. 
Hypothesis 2. Molecular assays will play an important role in investigating the source of HAV 
infections. 
Hypothesis 3. Compared with epidemiological investigations, molecular investigation will 
show a higher capacity to detect relationships between HAV cases during outbreak 
investigations. 
Aims 
1. To compare the HAV genotyping results determined by the VIDRL in-house primer sets 
with that obtained with the HAVNET primer sets. 
2. To investigate genetic relationships between the current diagnostic samples and those 
obtained from previous HAV cases.  
3. To identify the role and benefit of molecular assays for infection source investigations 
during HAV outbreaks. 
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The first objective of the project was to establish an epidemiological and molecular database 
of HAV strains in Victoria, based on the sequencing results. This was consolidated with the 
databases from other Australian States and Territories into an Australian HAV database, which 
is important for source tracing investigations during outbreaks. 
The second objective was to identify any relationships between previous HAV infections and 
can be used for source tracing of hepatitis A infections. This step is expected to identify the 
link between samples of current previous hepatitis A infection cases. 
The third objective was to discover the usefulness of molecular assays during source trace 
investigations of current hepatitis A infections to determine the effectiveness of molecular 
assays, compared with current epidemiological investigation methods. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
2.1. Project Location and Timeline 
This project was carried out in laboratories with Physical Containment Level 2 (PC2) standard 
at the Victoria Infectious Disease Reference Laboratory (VIDRL), Melbourne, Australia. The 
laboratory work was performed from June 2016 until December 2017. 
 
2.2. Project Outline 
In general, the project involved genotyping serum samples known to be HAV RNA-positive.  
The genotyping process consisted of viral RNA extraction, reverse transcription and nested 
PCR (RT-PCR), Sanger sequencing, sequence analysis, and gene Basic Local Alignment 
Search Tool (BLAST) searches of the National Center of Biotechnology Information (NCBI) 
GenBank database. The project was divided into Parts A and B. Each part of the project utilised 
the same genotyping method but used different sets of samples. 
Part A was a retrospective study which involved testing the HAV RNA-positive samples stored 
in the VIDRL sample bank. It amplified the HAV RNA using an international consensus PCR 
primer set (HAVNET73 primers consisting of first round and second round, also known as 
nested, PCR primers) and sequencing the positive PCR products with the internal HAVNET 
primers. After being analysed, the sequences were compared with any previously identified 
HAV genotype generated from the VIDRL in-house (OD1) primers. Both primer sets were 
deduced from the viral protein 1/non-structural protein 2A (VP1/P2A) junction. The HAVNET 
sequences generated from Part A were stored and managed using the Geneious software 
platform to establish a local molecular and epidemiological database.  
Part B was a prospective study of samples coming into VIDRL for HAV RNA testing. Samples 
were tested as part of a diagnostic assay work-up. Generally, samples would have been shown 
to have IgM antibodies to HAV (anti-HAV IgM) and be referred, either internally from VIDRL 
serology or external laboratories, for HAV PCR. As with Part A, in Part B any HAV RNA was 
amplified from the samples using the HAVNET primers and the positive PCR products were 
sequenced to identify the genotype. The sequences were added to the established molecular 
and epidemiological database and compared with HAV sequences in the database. Each 
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identified match with any previous cases was reported as part of the diagnostic genotyping 
result. 
 
2.3. Materials and Equipment 
 
2.3.1. Viral RNA extraction 
Instruments used for RNA extraction: 
- Biological Safety Cabinet Class II (Safemate 1.2, Laftech, Bayswater North, VIC) 
- Centrifuge (Eppendorf, Germany) 
- Collection tubes (QIAGEN, Melbourne, VIC) 
- Micro centrifuge tubes (SSI Bio, Lodi, CA, USA) 
- Micropipettes (Finnpipette, Thermo Fisher Scientific, Melbourne, VIC) 
- Micropipette tips (Pathtech, Melbourne, VIC) 
- QIAmp Mini columns (QIAGEN) 
- Vortex (Corning™ LSE™, Fisher Scientific, USA)
 
2.3.1.1. Reverse transcription nested polymerase chain reaction (nested RT-PCR)  
Instruments used for nested RT-PCR amplification: 
- Biological Safety Cabinet Class II (Safemate 1.2) 
- Centrifuge (Eppendorf) 
- Dry heat block (Ratek, Melbourne, VIC) 
- Electrophoresis power pack (Bio-Rad, Oakleigh, VIC) 
- Electrophoresis unit (Bio-Rad) 
- Gel Doc system (Gel Doc 2000 system, Bio-Rad) 
- Micropipettes (Finnpipette) 
- Micropipette tips (Pathtech) 
- PCR strip tubes (Thermo Fisher Scientific) 
- Thermal cycler (Veriti™ 96, Applied Biosystems, USA) 
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2.3.1.2. Sequencing 
Instruments used for sequencing: 
- Biological Safety Cabinet Class II (Safemate 1.2) 
- Centrifuge (Eppendorf) 
- Dry heat block (Ratek) 
- Micro centrifuge tubes (SSI Bio) 
- Micropipettes (Finnpipette) 
- Micropipette tips (Pathtech) 
- PCR strip tubes (Thermo Fisher Scientific) 
- Thermal cycler (Veriti™ 96) 
- Vortex (Corning™ LSE™) 
 
2.3.2. Reagents 
 
2.3.2.1. Viral RNA extraction using the QIAGEN QIAamp® RNA Mini Kit (QIAGEN, 
Melbourne, Australia) 
Reagents and chemicals used for RNA extraction: 
- 96% Ethanol (Merck, Melbourne, VIC) 
- Buffer AVL 
- Buffer AVE 
- Buffer AW1 
- Buffer AW2 
 
2.3.2.2. Reverse transcription nested polymerase chain reaction  
Reagents and chemicals used for nested RT-PCR amplification: 
- 1x TAE buffer (Thermo Fisher Scientific, Melbourne) 
- 2x Reaction mix (SuperScript III One-Step RT-PCR System with Platinum Taq 
Polymerase, Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA) 
- 5x Q buffer (QIAGEN Taq polymerase and buffers) 
- 10x Taq buffer (QIAGEN Taq polymerase and buffers) 
- 1.5% Agarose gel (Scientifix, Melbourne, VIC) 
- dNTPs (Promega, Sydney, Australia) 
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- Hepatitis A virus primers (Bioneer, Korea) 
- Nuclease free water (Promega) 
- RNasin (Promega) 
- Taq DNA polymerase (QIAGEN Taq polymerase and buffers) 
- Taq mix (SuperScript III One-Step RT-PCR System with Platinum Taq Polymerase, 
Invitrogen) 
- DNA loading dye (6x DNA loading dye, Thermo Fisher Scientific) 
- DNA ladder marker (GeneRuler 1 kb DNA Ladder, Thermo Fisher Scientific) 
- Ethidium bromide (Sigma-Aldrich, MO, USA)
 
2.3.2.3. Sequencing 
Reagents and chemicals used for sequencing were as follow: 
- 3 M sodium acetate (Sigma-Aldrich) 
- 5x Seq buffer (BigDye buffer, Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA, USA) 
- 70% Ethanol (Merck) 
- 96% Ethanol (Merck) 
- BigDye Terminator v3.1 (Applied Biosystems) 
- ExoSAP-IT (USB, Cleveland, Ohio, USA) 
- Hepatitis A virus sequencing primers (Bioneer) 
- Nuclease free water (Promega) 
 
2.4. Samples 
Subsequent to the large Australian HAV outbreak associated with the semidried tomatoes,46 
VIDRL, in conjunction with the Victorian Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 
decided to genotype any HAV RNA-positive samples as a tool to try and gain more information 
about HAV epidemiology and to monitor for possible outbreaks. An HAV working group was 
also established under the auspices of OzFoodNet to develop a national HAV surveillance plan.  
In this thesis, all patient details have been de-identified with only the VIDRL reference number 
being used to distinguish samples. 
Each part of the project used different sets of samples. In Part A, the tested samples were 
acquired from the VIDRL sample bank. These samples were known to be HAV RNA-positive 
by an in-house RT-PCR assay, and many had been previously genotyped using the VIDRL in-
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house primer set. They included serum samples collected between 2010 and 2015 which had 
sufficient volume for RNA extraction (>140 µl). In Part B, new diagnostic samples, entered 
from 2016 onward, were tested. These samples had been shown to be HAV RNA-positive using 
the RealStar assay (Altona Diagnostic, Germany), a real-time PCR based assay, and then 
genotyped by following the HAVNET protocol. 
Both parts of the project used three control samples to monitor the quality of the assays. They 
included the HAV sequence-positive control, a negative control and a non-template control. 
The HAV sequence-positive control was one that shown a CT (cycle threshold) value of around 
30 and a positive sequencing result by previous genotyping. The negative control was an 
aliquot of a Roche diluent (a negative plasma control from the Roche HBsAg II assay), while 
the non-template control was a mixture consisting of nuclease-free water and PCR master mix. 
The HAV sequence-positive and negative controls were processed along with the test samples 
and were also subjected to RNA extraction and nested RT-PCR. Once the nested RT-PCR 
showed a sample to be positive, the HAV sequence-positive control was sequenced along with 
the positive patient serum samples. The non-template control was added to the nested RT-PCR 
assay and was used to monitor for the possibility of contamination during the process. 
 
2.5. Methods 
 
2.5.1. Viral RNA extraction 
The samples underwent an RNA extraction to purify any HAV RNA. The RNA extraction 
method used was from the QIAmp viral RNA Mini Kit (QIAGEN, Melbourne, Australia) and 
the manufacturer’s instructions were followed. A total of 560 μl of lysis buffer AVL was 
aliquoted into a 1.5 ml micro centrifuge tube and then 140 μl of serum added. The contents 
were mixed by a pulse-vortex for 15 s and then incubated at room temperature (15-25oC) for 
10 min. The tubes were briefly centrifuged to remove drops from inside of the lid. An aliquot 
of 560 μl ethanol (96-100%) was added and mixed by pulse-vortex for 15 s. After mixing, the 
tube was briefly centrifuged to remove drops from inside of the lid. One half of the reaction 
mix (630 μl) was then applied to a QIAmp Mini column (in a 2 ml collection tube) without 
wetting the rim. The contents were centrifuged at 8000 rpm for 1 min, and the QIAmp Mini 
column then placed into a clean collection tube, while the collection tube containing the filtrate 
was discarded. These steps were repeated for the remaining half of the mixture.  An aliquot of 
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500 μl of wash buffer AW1 was added into the QIAmp Mini column and the column 
centrifuged at 8000 rpm for 1 min. The QIAmp Mini column was removed and placed into a 
clean 2 ml collection tube with the collection tube containing the filtrate discarded. An aliquot 
of 500 μl of wash buffer AW2 was added to the QIAmp Mini column and the column 
centrifuged at 14000 rpm for 3 min. The QIAmp Mini column was removed and placed into a 
clean 2 ml collection tube with the collection tube containing the filtrate discarded.  The QIAmp 
Mini column was given an additional spin at 14000 rpm for 1 min to dry. The QIAmp Mini 
column was placed in a clean 1.5 ml micro centrifuge tube and 60 μl of the elution buffer AVE 
added. The column was incubated at room temperature for 1 min and then centrifuged at 8000 
rpm for 1 min. The filtrate in the micro centrifuge tube contained the extracted RNA, which 
could be stored at -70oC for future use. 
 
2.5.2. Reverse transcription nested polymerase chain reaction methods 
HAV is an RNA virus and for PCR amplification, the RNA has to be first reverse transcribed 
into complementary (c) DNA. The reverse transcription method used in this project was part 
of a one-step RT-PCR amplification. In one-step RT-PCR, the reverse transcription precedes 
the PCR cycle step but both steps take place in the one tube using a blend of reverse 
transcriptase and Taq DNA polymerase enzymes. The PCR amplification in this project was 
nested PCR which consists of two rounds of PCR cycling with an internal set of primers used 
for the second round. 
 
2.5.2.1. PCR primers 
The PCR primers for HAV amplification were the primers which had been designed by 
HAVNET (Table 2.1). The internal primers amplify a 520 nucleotide (nt) fragment spanning 
the region encoding VP1/P2A of the HAV genome and, after trimming, routinely provided a 
reliable sequence of 460 nt.73 This sequence is longer than that of the VIDRL OD1 in-house 
primers previously used which amplifies a product of 233 nt.74  
 
 
 
 32 
 
 
Primer 
Name 
Sequence (5' > 3') Direction Function 
HAVNET 
F1 
TAT GCY GTN TCW GGN 
GCN YTR GAY GG 
Forward First-outer 
HAVNET 
R1 
TCY TTC ATY TCW GTC 
CAY TTY TCA TCA TT 
Reverse 
RT and 
First-outer 
HAVNET 
F2 
GGA TTG GTT TCC ATT 
CAR ATT GCN AAY TA 
Forward 
Nested-
inner 
HAVNET 
R2 
CTG CCA GTC AGA ACT 
CCR GCW TCC ATY TC 
Reverse 
Nested-
inner 
 
Table 2.1. Nested RT-PCR primer sets 
Y= C/T; W= A/T; R= A/G; N= any base 
The primer concentration used as the working stock was 30 µM for the first-outer primers and 
10 µM for the nested-inner primers. 
 
2.5.2.2. PCR master mix 
The reverse transcription and first round PCR was carried out using SuperScript III One-Step 
RT-PCR System with Platinum Taq Polymerase (Invitrogen). The master mix (15 µl total 
volume) contents were: 
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Reagents 
Volume of Reagent Added 
per Reaction (μl) 
2x Reaction mix 10 
Nuclease free water 3.8 
HAVNET F1 
(30 μM) 
0.4 
HAVNET R1 
(30 μM) 
0.4 
RNasin 0.25 
Taq mix 0.4 
 
Table 2.2. Reverse transcription and first round PCR master mix 
The second round PCR was carried out using QIAGEN Taq polymerase and buffers. The 
master mix (48 µl total volume) contents were:  
Reagents 
Volume of Reagent 
Added per Reaction 
(μl) 
Nuclease free water 27.5 
5x Q buffer 10 
10x Taq buffer 5 
HAVNET F2 (10 μM) + 
HAVNET R2 (10 μM) 
5 
20 mM dNTP 0.5 
Taq DNA polymerase 0.25 
 
Table 2.3. Nested (second round) PCR master mix 
 
2.5.2.3. PCR cycling conditions 
Initially, the RNA was amplified by the one-step RT-PCR where the reverse transcription step 
precedes the first round PCR amplification in the same tube. Before this step, any RNA present 
must be linearized to optimise the reverse transcription. The samples were prepared by 
incubating the RNA samples on a dry heat block at 65oC for 10 min to relax the secondary 
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structure. Briefly, the tube was centrifuged to remove drops from the inside of the lid and then 
cooled immediately on ice. A total of 5 μl of each RNA sample was added into the RT-PCR 
master mix. The mixture was mixed thoroughly by pipetting up and down, followed by brief 
centrifugation of the PCR strip tubes. Finally, the strip tubes were placed into the thermal cycler 
for RT and first round PCR.  
The samples were run using the following cycles: 
Step Temperature (oC) Time  
Reverse 
transcription 
50 30 min 
Denaturation 94 2 min 
PCR (40 cycles) 
94 30 sec 
50 30 sec 
72 30 sec 
Final extension 72 5 min 
Cooling 10 10 min 
 
Table 2.4. RT and first round PCR cycles 
After the RT and first round PCR, the samples were prepared for the nested PCR amplification. 
A total of 2 μl of the first round PCR product was added into the tube containing the second 
round PCR master mix. The reagents were mixed thoroughly by pipetting up and down, 
followed by pulse centrifugation of the PCR strip tube. The PCR tubes were placed in the 
thermal cycler for second round PCR amplification, according to the following conditions: 
Step Temperature (oC) Time  
Denaturation 94 2 min 
PCR (25 cycles) 
94 30 sec 
50 30 sec 
72 30 sec 
Final extension 72 5 min 
Cooling 10 10 min 
 
Table 2.5. Nested (second round) PCR cycle 
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2.5.2.4. Agarose gel electrophoresis 
Visualisation of the nested RT-PCR product was performed by agarose gel electrophoresis. 
Both the first and the second round PCR product were loaded onto a 1.5% agarose gel, 
incorporating ethidium bromide, as in the following steps: (1), add 2 μl loading dye into the 
well of the mixing plate; (2), add 5 μl PCR product into the well and mix by pipetting up and 
down. The mixture was then added into the corresponding well of the agarose gel in 1X TAE 
buffer and electrophoresed at 75 V for 1 h. The gel was photographed by using Gel Doc system 
(BIO-RAD Gel Doc 2000 system). The expected product size for the first round PCR was 614 
base pairs (bp), and for the second round 520 bp, the same size as the positive HAV control.73 
The 1 kb DNA ladder was used as a marker when analysing the electrophoresis outcome. 
 
2.5.3. Sequencing 
 
2.5.3.1. Sequencing primers 
HAV sequencing was performed using the following primer pairs: 
Name Sequence (5' > 3') Direction 
HAVNET 
F2 
GGA TTG GTT TCC ATT 
CAR ATT GCN AAY TA 
F 
HAVNET 
R2 
CTG CCA GTC AGA ACT 
CCR GCW TCC ATY TC 
R 
 
Table 2.6. Sequencing primer sets 
Y= C/T; W= A/T; R= A/G; N= any base 
 
2.5.3.2. Sequencing master mix 
The sequencing master mix was made up to a total volume of 10.5 µl and consisted of the 
following reagents: 
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Reagents 
Volume of Reagent 
Added per Reaction (μl) 
Nuclease-free water 6.5 
5x Seq buffer 2 
Big dye terminator 1 
Primer 1 or primer 2 
(3.2 μM) 
1 
 
Table 2.7. Sequencing master mix 
 
2.5.3.3. Sequencing clean-up 
Before starting the gene sequencing, the PCR component reagents had to be removed from the 
PCR product. The ExoSAP-IT kit was used according to the manufacturer’s instructions. Five 
microliters of PCR product was added to a micro centrifuge tube followed by 2 µl ExoSAP-
IT.  The mixture was incubated at 37oC for 15 min to hydrolyze excess primers and nucleotides 
and then heated at 80oC for 15 min to inactivate the ExoSAP-IT.  
 
2.5.3.4 Sequencing reactions 
The clean PCR product was diluted, according to the band intensity from the agarose gel 
electrophoresis. A total of 1.5 µl of the diluted PCR product was added to the master mix. The 
mixture was mixed by pipetting up and down, followed by a brief spin. The DNA was amplified 
on the thermal cycler according to the following program:  
Step Temperature (oC) Time (sec) 
Denaturation 96 10 
PCR (25 cycles) 
96 10 
50 5 
60 240 
Cooling 4 ∞ 
 
Table 2.8. Sequencing amplification cycle 
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Precipitation of the DNA and wash steps followed the DNA amplification. This was carried 
out by preparing a mixture consisting of 8 µl of nuclease-free water and 2 µl 3 M sodium 
acetate in a micro centrifuge tube. In the next step 12 µl of the amplified product was added 
into the micro centrifuge, followed by 50 µl of 96% ethanol and the contents mixed thoroughly. 
Next, the mixture was incubated at room temperature for 20 min and then centrifuged in the 
micro centrifuge at full speed for 20 min. Before spinning, the hinge of the tube was placed 
facing away from the rotor. The supernatant was removed carefully by pipetting from the 
opposite side of the tube hinge. In the next step, the pellet was washed by adding 160 µl 70% 
ethanol and then centrifuged in the micro centrifuge at full speed for 5 min. The hinge of the 
tube was placed facing away from the rotor and the supernatant was carefully removed by 
pipetting from the opposite side. The pellet in the tube was dried by incubating at 37oC for 10 
– 20 min. The sample was then ready for the capillary electrophoresis process. 
 
2.5.3.5. Capillary electrophoresis 
Capillary electrophoresis for the sequencing sample was performed at the Micromon 
Sequencing Facility at Monash University. When completed, the capillary electrophoresis 
output (.ab1 file and .seq file) was uploaded to the server. The .ab1 and .seq file(s) were 
downloaded and accessed by login to the Micromon FTP (File Transfer Protocol) site. 
 
2.5.3.6. Sequencing and BLAST analysis  
The sequencing results were analysed using SeqScape Software v2.1.1 (Applied Biosystems, 
USA). This analysis included aligning, trimming and finally exporting the consensus sequence 
to the patient database. After being analysed, the sequence data was uploaded to the National 
Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) BLAST (Basic Local Alignment Search Tool) 
to determine the HAV genotype. Besides BLAST through NCBI, the sequences were also 
uploaded into a local database established using the Geneious R7 software. The Geneious 
program was used to create the HAV sequence database and identify any relationship between 
the HAV sequences of new diagnostic samples and those already stored in the database. 
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2.5.3.7. Sequencing results: accessing and processing 
The Micromon facility uploaded the sequencing results to the FTP server and issued an email 
to notify the sender that the results were ready. The raw sequence data was then retrieved using 
FileZilla software. The results can be accessed by login to the Micromon FTP site using 
username and password. Once logged in, the data could be viewed in the results folder which 
is usually named according to the surname of the sender and the date when it was uploaded to 
the server. The next step was to highlight all the .ab1 and .seq files and download them to a 
folder on the local VIDRL server. The downloaded files were ready for further analysis. 
All the chromatograms generated for a patient sample were processed using the SeqScape 
v2.1.1 software (Applied Biosystems, USA). SeqScape is a DNA resequencing package that 
enables automatic processing and assembly of multiple chromatograms to generate a single 
consensus nucleotide sequence by alignment to a pre-stored reference sequence. Before 
generating the project, it was required to login to the SeqScape account. The new project was 
created by selecting “New Project” from the main menu. In the dialog box, the Project 
Template “Hepatitis A” was selected and the patient’s name and date of birth were entered. On 
the main menu “Import Samples To Project” was selected. In the “Files” sub-window, the 
chromatogram (the .ab1 file fetched from the Micromon server) files for import were located. 
The next step was to create a New Specimen by clicking the “New Specimen” tab. It was 
followed by double clicking on the “Specimen 1” name to rename the specimen with the patient 
laboratory number and then hitting the “Enter” key. Next, all the chromatograms were selected 
(files belong to forward and reverse sequences) belonging to the chosen specimen for importing 
and the “Add Sample>>” button clicked. After all the appropriate samples have been added, 
the “OK” button was clicked, followed by clicking the green arrow icon on the toolbar to start 
the sequences alignment. Once analysed, the “NC_001489” (the accession number of the HAV 
sequence extracted from GenBank) was selected under the specimen sample ID. The assembly 
tab was selected, and the consensus sequence generated by the assembly was located on the 
top row. Trimming both ends of the consensus sequence consisted of two steps. Initially, the 
cursor was placed on a nucleotide which does not show a mixed population, right mouse 
clicked, and “Set CR start [ at selection” selected. For the alternate end, the cursor was placed 
on a nucleotide which does not show a mixed population, right mouse clicked, and “Set CR 
end ] at selection” selected. After the sequence was trimmed, the consensus sequence was 
assessed to ensure there was no mixed population (shown by a red column bar). When the 
entire consensus sequence had been assessed, the project was saved by selecting “Save Project” 
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from the main menu. This step was followed by selecting the “Export Consensus” from the 
main menu, choosing the specific folder and clicking the export button. Finally, the consensus 
sequence (referred to as HAVNET sequence from here on) was saved as a text file in FASTA 
format and was ready for subsequent analyses. 
 
2.5.3.8. HAV genotyping 
HAV was genotyped by subjecting the HAVNET sequence to a nucleotide homology search 
against the publicly accessible nucleotide sequence database 75 hosted at the website of the 
National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI). The search was performed using the 
Basic Local Alignment Search Tool (BLAST), which is one of the bioinformatics tools 
available at the NCBI website. The search query returned the top 100 nucleotide sequences 
from the NCBI nucleotide database that were the most homologous to the HAVNET sequence 
queried. Each nucleotide sequence in the returned list has a GenBank accession number and 
data about the genotype (and subtype) and the origin of the sequence. The genotype of the 
queried HAV sample is equated to the genotype of the best matched HAV sequence. 
The NCBI nucleotide BLAST was performed by opening the consensus FASTA file. The 
sequence was highlighted, followed by right mouse click, and “copy” selected. After launching 
the NCBI nucleotide BLAST website at 
https://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi?PROGRAM=blastn&PAGE_TYPE=BlastSearch&LI
NK_LOC=blasthome, the sequence was copied into the Enter Query Sequence box by clicking 
the BLAST button which opened a new window. The strain on the top of the list was chosen 
by clicking the accession number to show the details of the strain with the report page 
identifying the genotype and its origin. 
 
2.5.3.9 Outbreak investigations 
The ability to rapidly and accurately identify HAV transmission cases can aid in reducing the 
magnitude of outbreaks. This can be accomplished by establishing a local custom BLAST 
database which includes unique HAV sequences determined from local HAV infected patients 
and those associated with major outbreaks from around the world. The local BLAST database 
was established using the Geneious R7 software,76 and the homology search algorithm used in 
Geneious is similar to the one hosted by NCBI.  
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Geneious is a desktop software program with a focus on tools to handle bioinformatics data. It 
has been designed as a software application framework for the organization and analysis of 
biological data focusing on molecular sequences and related data types. The Geneious software 
program allowed the creation of a custom HAV BLAST database based on sequences stored 
within the program. Creating the database from stored HAV sequences was performed by 
selecting all the HAV sequences to be included into the BLAST database (ensuring the index 
cases of outbreaks are properly labelled). The “Tools” tab was chosen, and from the 
“Add/Remove Databases” drop-down box, the “Add Sequence Database” was selected. After 
the next screen opened, “Custom BLAST” from the drop-down box was opened and “use 
selected sequences” is selected, a name was entered for inclusion in the database, and “OK” 
clicked. 
 
The local BLAST database was built using the HAV sequences from Part A of the project. 
Geneious allows searching current sequences against the available database, either the 
downloaded NCBI database or the customised database. To perform outbreak investigations, 
the new HAV sequence (query sequence) was imported to Geneious. The next step was 
selection of the HAV sequence for analysis and choosing “Tools/Sequence Search” from the 
menu bar. Finally, the local BLAST database was selected for use, and the search function 
chosen. 
The BLAST results were shown in a tabular form where the most genetically related sequence 
from previous HAV cases would appear at the top of the list. HAV sequences of previous cases 
with two or less nucleotide differences when compared to the query sequence were considered 
to be genetically related. 
 
2.5.4 Phylogenetic analysis 
Phylogenetic analysis was performed by generating a phylogenetic tree to assess the genetic 
relationships between HAV strains. Phylogenetic trees were generated with the Mega6 (v6.06) 
software using the Maximum Likelihood (ML) statistical method. The substitution model used 
to estimate evolutionary distances between the HAV sequences was based on the model testing 
algorithm (the “find best DNA/protein model” test) implemented in Mega6. 
The following HAV sequences, representing the human HAV genotypes extracted from 
GenBank, were used as references in the ML phylogenetic tree: HAV-IA (GBM-wt, X75215), 
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HAV-IB (HM-175-wt, M14707), HAV-IIA (CF53, AY644676), HAV-IIB (SLF88, 
AY644670), HAV-IIIA (NOR-21, AJ299464), and HAV-IIIB (HAJ85-1F, AB279735). 
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2.6. Workflow 
 
  
Hepatitis A virus RNA positive samples 
Viral RNA extraction 
Nested RT-PCR 
Agarose gel electrophoresis 
Sanger sequencing 
Compared with the 
previous 
genotyping results 
Established molecular 
and epidemiological 
database 
Tested against the 
sequences in the 
established database 
Added to the database 
Part A Part B 
Positive samples 
Figure 2.1. The project workflow 
 43 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
PROJECT PART A: HEPATITIS A VIRUS GENOTYPING – RETROSPECTIVE 
SAMPLES 
 
3.1. Sample Collection from VIDRL Sample Bank 
One of the objectives of the project was to establish an epidemiological and molecular database 
of HAV strains in Victoria. It required retrospectively collecting and sequencing HAV samples 
which had been isolated from previous HAV cases. Besides being used as references for the 
database, the samples needed to be re-sequenced using a consensus primer set (HAVNET) to 
enable comparison with HAV sequences from current diagnostic samples and HAV sequences 
from other international reference laboratories. These steps were to be performed in Part A of 
the project. 
Part A required searching the VIDRL database for all HAV RNA-positive samples received 
from January 2010 to December 2015. The majority of these previous HAV RNA-positive 
samples had been amplified and genotyped using the VIDRL in-house PCR and sequencing 
primers as part of a Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) initiated investigation 
and follow-up of a HAV outbreak associated with semi-dried tomatoes.65 This part of the 
project would enable confirmation of the previous HAV genotypes and comparison with the 
results between HAVNET and VIDRL in-house genotyping. The HAVNET primer set 
amplifies a longer fragment of the HAV genome than the VIDRL in-house primers. The 
differences in the two primer sets could have consequences for the initial genotyping results. 
Only samples with sufficient volumes for RNA extraction (optimally 140 µl) were evaluated 
in this part of the project. 
Of 228 samples identified as HAV RNA-positive, only 144 (63%) had sufficient volume for 
PCR and genotyping using the HAVNET protocol. The genotyping assay consisted of viral 
RNA extraction, nested reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (nested RT-PCR), and 
sequencing using the Sanger DNA sequencing method followed by sequence comparisons 
using the Basic Local Alignment Search Tool (BLAST) algorithm within the GenBank 
database to identify the genotypes. 
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Year Total Samples  
Samples 
Sufficient for 
Testing 
2010 41 33 
2011 13 11 
2012 12 7 
2013 36 11 
2014 32 19 
2015 94 63 
Total 228 144 
Table 3.1. The number of hepatitis A virus samples received between January 2010 and 
December 2015 which were collected from the VIDRL sample bank.  
 
Figure 3.1. Total hepatitis A virus samples available from the VIDRL sample bank from 
January 2010 to December 2015. 
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Figure 3.2. Total hepatitis A virus samples received between January 2010 and December 
2015 with sufficient volume for genotyping. 
 
3.2. Nested RT-PCR Results – HAVNET Protocol 
Samples with sufficient volumes were extracted using the QIAamp viral RNA mini kit 
(Qiagen) according to the manufacturer’s instructions. The RNA extraction procedure was then 
followed by a nested RT-PCR using a one-step RT-PCR, where the reverse transcription and 
the first round PCR were performed using the one reaction mix in the same tube. The RT-PCR 
products were used as templates for the nested (second round) PCR steps. The thermal cycling 
conditions of the nested RT-PCR were carried out according to the HAVNET procedures. The 
PCR products from the first round and the nested PCR were subsequently electrophoresed on 
an agarose gel and then visualised and documented using the Bio-Rad Gel Doc system. The 
HAVNET primers amplified a portion of the genome encoding the HAV VP1/2A region, the 
same region amplified by the VIDRL in-house primers (OD1 primer set). However, the 
HAVNET primers amplified a larger fragment with an expected product size of 614 base pairs 
(bp) and 520 bp, for the first round and nested PCR, respectively. 
Two types of sample controls were added during the whole process: a HAV sequence positive 
control and a negative control. An aliquoted HAV RNA-positive serum sample of known 
sequence was used as a sequence-positive control, and as a negative control, a negative plasma 
control from the Roche HBsAg II assay was used. These two controls underwent the same 
RNA extraction and nested RT-PCR as for the patient samples. As quality control for the nested 
144
63%
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37%
Samples Sufficient for Genotyping
Samples Sufficient
for Genotyping
Sample Insufficient
for Genotyping
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RT-PCR master mix, a non-template control was added to monitor for contamination. The non-
template control contained the reaction mix, with nuclease-free water added in place of the 
corresponding sample aliquot. A sample was considered positive if it showed a band migrating 
with the correct size after gel electrophoresis. 
 
3.2.1. Serum samples from 2010 
Forty-one samples were located and 33 had sufficient volume for PCR and genotyping. The 
nested RT-PCR resulted in 30 samples that were HAV-RNA positive and three that were 
negative. Compared with the previous VIDRL in-house genotyping results, two out of three 
negative results were positive using the VIDRL genotyping. This suggested that the HAVNET 
primers failed to amplify the HAV RNA; this may have been caused by inhibition or 
degradation of the HAV RNA.77,78 Among those positive samples, ten samples were part of the 
2009 semi-dried tomato outbreak. Figure 3.3 shows an example of an agarose gel with the 
nested PCR products for samples from 2010.  
 
Figure 3.3. Agarose gel of nested PCR samples from work sheet 160923005, 
one of the work sheets which listed HAV samples collected after consulting the 
2010 database. Ten samples (lanes 2 – 11) were included in the work sheet. A: 
first round PCR (RT-PCR); B: second round PCR (nested-PCR); Lane 1: DNA 
marker ladder; Lanes 2 – 11: patient serum samples; Lane 12: negative control; 
Lane 13: sequence-positive control; Lane 14: non-template control. 
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3.2.2. Serum samples from 2011 
There were 13 samples identified from the VIDRL database, of which 11 had sufficient volume 
for genotyping. Among those, only ten were HAV RNA PCR-positive. Two of the positive 
samples which showed a faint band where retested with the commercial diagnostic real-time 
PCR assay showed CT values of 34, consistent with a low titre. These results showed that low 
virus titre was the most probable cause of the HAV RNA amplification being suboptimal.79 
Figure 3.4 shows the nested RT-PCR results of work sheet 160909005. Samples 2 – 11 in the 
work sheet were from 2011. 
 
Figure 3.4. Agarose gel of nested PCR samples from work sheet 160909005, one out of 
two work sheets which consisted of HAV samples from 2011. Ten 2011 (lanes 2 – 11) 
samples included in the work sheet. A: first round PCR (RT-PCR); B: second round PCR 
(nested-PCR); Lane 1: DNA marker ladder; Lanes 2 – 11: patient serum samples; Lane 
12: negative control; Lane 13: sequence-positive control; Lane 14: non-template control. 
 
3.2.3. Serum samples from 2012 
Of 12 samples identified from the VIDRL database, there were seven with sufficient volume 
for genotyping. Nested RT-PCR assays showed that all the samples were PCR positive. It 
showed that the HAVNET primer set was able to amplify all HAV samples from 2012. Figure 
3.5 shows positive bands for lanes 2 – 8 which were samples from 2012; samples in lanes 9 – 
11 were current (2016 – 2017) diagnostic samples.  
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Figure 3.5. Agarose gel of nested PCR samples from work sheet 160919035 which 
consisted of samples from 2012 (lanes 2 – 8) and current diagnostic samples (lanes 9 – 
11). A: first round PCR (RT-PCR); B: second round PCR (nested-PCR); Lane 1: DNA 
marker ladder; Lanes 2 – 11: patient serum samples; Lane 12: negative control; Lane 
13: sequence-positive control; Lane 14: non-template control. 
 
3.2.4. Serum samples from 2013 
Of 36 samples from 2013 that had been shown to be HAV RNA-positive, only 11 were 
available for genotyping. Among these, there was one PCR negative sample and two PCR 
positive samples with faint bands. Therefore, only eight samples were suitable for genotyping. 
Two out of those three samples had shown positive results on previous VIDRL genotyping. 
This suggested that HAVNET PCR primer sets failed to amplify the HAV RNA. In Figure 3.6, 
lanes 4 – 11 were serum samples acquired in 2013; samples in lanes 2, 3 and 12, 13 were 
current diagnostic samples. 
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Figure 3.6. Agarose gel of nested PCR samples from work sheet 160829026, which 
consisted of eight samples (lanes 4 – 11) from 2010, and the other four (lanes 2, 3, 12 
and 13) were from 2016 (current diagnostic samples). A: first round PCR (RT-PCR); B: 
second round PCR (nested-PCR); Lane 1: DNA marker ladder; Lanes 2 – 13: patient 
serum samples; Lane 14: negative control; Lane 15: sequence-positive control; Lane 16: 
non-template control. 
 
3.2.5. Serum samples from 2014 
There were 32 samples previously shown to be HAV-RNA positive from 2014 according to 
the database, and 19 samples had sufficient volume for genotyping. The nested RT-PCR assay 
showed one sample to be PCR negative and 18 were PCR positive. In Figure 3.7, lanes 2 – 11 
were samples from 2014. Lane 2 was a sample with a faint band, and lane 4 was a sample with 
negative result. It showed that there was amplification failure in several samples in the work 
sheet with RNA degradation the most probable cause of the suboptimal PCR amplification. 
However, there might be another cause because the sequence positive control which is made 
from positive current diagnostic samples also showed a faint band.  
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Figure 3.7. Agarose gel of nested PCR samples from work sheet 160907009, which 
consisted of HAV samples from 2014 (lanes 2 – 11). A: first round PCR (RT-PCR); B: 
second round PCR (nested-PCR); Lane 1: DNA marker ladder; Lanes 2 – 11: patient 
serum samples; Lane 12: negative control; Lane 13: sequence-positive control; Lane 14: 
non-template control. 
 
3.2.6. Serum samples from 2015 
The year 2015 had the largest number of HAV samples (94) compared to previous years, 
however, on retrieval only 63 had sufficient volume for the genotyping assay. Several samples 
were part of the 2015 mixed frozen berries outbreak. A total of 57 samples were positive and 
six were negative by nested RT-PCR. Among those positive, 15 samples came from the mixed 
frozen berries outbreak. Figure 3.8 shows the positive results for the work sheet which 
consisted of samples collected in 2015. 
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Figure 3.8. Agarose gel of nested PCR samples from work sheet 160518054, one out of 
eight work sheets which consisted of HAV samples from 2015 (lanes 2 – 11). A: first 
round PCR (RT-PCR); B: second round PCR (nested-PCR); Lane 1: DNA marker ladder; 
Lanes 2 – 11: patient serum samples; Lane 12: negative control; Lane 13: sequence-
positive control 
Overall, for Part A of the project, 228 samples were assessed as being previously HAV RNA-
positive and available in the VIDRL sample bank. Of these, 144 had sufficient volume for RNA 
extraction and amplification with the HAVNET primer sets. The nested RT-PCR showed that 
130 (90%) samples were PCR positive, and 14 (10%) were PCR negative. The negative 
samples comprised three samples from 2010, a sample from 2011, three from 2013, a sample 
from 2014 and six from 2015. The results suggested that the HAVNET primer sets were unable 
to amplify HAV RNA from several previously positive serum samples. Several possible causes 
include factors associated with the primer sets or the virus itself. The samples may contain 
substances which inhibit the PCR reactions, or the RNA may have been degraded.78,79 In 
addition, the HAVNET primers may be less sensitive compared to the VIDRL in-house primer 
sets. Other issues may be low virus titre in some samples and genetic variations of the virus 
which prevents binding with the HAVNET primers.78 
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Figure 3.9. Nested RT-PCR results of all the HAV samples which were collected during the 
project Part A. 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Nested RT-PCR result of the HAV samples each year which were collected 
during project Part A. 
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3.3. Hepatitis A Virus Sequencing and Genotyping 
The HAV samples shown to be PCR positive by HAVNET nested RT-PCR were genotyped 
using the Sanger DNA sequencing method. The sequence-positive control was also genotyped 
as part of quality control assessment. The sequencing process consisted of several steps, 
including cleaning the PCR products from the PCR reagents, amplifying and purifying the 
complementary DNA (cDNA), followed by capillary electrophoresis. The PCR products were 
cleaned using an ExoSAP-IT kit. The cleaned samples were then added to the reaction mix 
which consisted of Big Dye Terminator reagents and HAVNET inner primers. Sequencing 
reactions using forward and reverse primers were amplified in separate tubes. The DNA was 
then precipitated and washed, and the dried pellets sent to the Micromon Sequencing Facility 
at Monash University for capillary electrophoresis.  
Sequences were analysed using SeqScape v2.1.1 to align and trim the sequences and then saved 
as FASTA files. The investigated sequences were then analysed using the BLAST algorithm 
against nucleotide sequences within the GenBank database. Here the closest match to the HAV 
sequences was identified to provide the genotype. If applicable, the genotype result was 
compared with previous genotypes, determined using the VIDRL in-house primer sets. 
Sequences were then stored in the local HAV sequence database created from the Geneious 
software platform and converted to a BLAST database for molecular and epidemiological 
investigations. 
 
3.3.1. Samples from 2010 - genotypes 
The nested RT-PCR results showed that 30 samples were HAV RNA-positive. Genotyping 
analysis showed that 15 samples were Genotype IA, 15 Genotype IB, and no Genotype IIIA 
was found. Table 3.2 shows the genotyping and NCBI (National Center of Biotechnology 
Information) BLAST search results of the samples from 2010. The first two numbers of the 
laboratory reference number (SAMPLE ID) signify the year of sample receipt. Based on the 
NCBI BLAST results, the table shows that several sequences had similarities to each other. 
Ten samples of the Genotype IB were part of the semi-dried tomato outbreak. All semi-dried 
tomato sample sequence showed 99% identity with GenBank accession number AY294049. 
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SAMPLE ID GENOTYPE NCBI BLAST 
10500706 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
10502255 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151439 
10504427 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
10505052 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
10505053 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
10505904 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
10506674 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151439 
10507078 IB 98% ident ACC# KU570245 
10507079 IB 98% ident ACC# KU570245 
10507512 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151439 
10507513 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151439 
10507514 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151439 
10510005 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
10510006 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
10510007 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
10510009 IA 99% ident ACC# LC036572 
10510419 IB 98% ident ACC# KU570245 
10510798 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151439 
10510850 IB 98% ident ACC# KU570245 
10512086 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
10512388 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
10512785 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
10513587 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
10514731 IA  99% ident ACC# X75216 
10514968 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151421 
10542099 IB 98% ident ACC# KU570245 
10547815 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
10551321 IA 98% ident ACC# HQ822086 
10553352 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
10581525 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
Table 3.2. Genotyping results of the 2010 samples. 
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3.3.2. Samples from 2011 - genotypes 
Ten samples were sequenced from those collected in 2011. The results showed that four 
samples were Genotype IA, three were Genotype IB and three were Genotype IIIA. Table 3.3 
shows the genotype of each sample. The NCBI BLAST results listed in the table shows that 
the HAV strains were more varied than the samples from 2010. 
SAMPLE ID GENOTYPE NCBI BLAST 
11506207 IIIA 99% ident ACC# FJ360734 
11507895 IA 99% ident ACC# LC014793 
11512324 IA 99% ident ACC# LC036572 
11514860 IIIA 95% ident ACC# AY644337 
11531186 IB 98% ident ACC# LC037391 
11531929 IIIA 99% ident ACC# AY644337 
11536229 IB 95% ident ACC# HQ246217 
11572975 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
11587613 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151456 
11605864 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
Table 3.3. Genotyping results of the 2011 samples. 
 
3.3.3. Samples from 2012 - genotypes 
There were seven HAV RNA-positive samples from 2012 patients. Genotyping revealed that 
five were Genotype IB and two were Genotype IIIA. The genotyping and NCBI BLAST search 
results of the 2012 samples are shown in Table 3.4. The NCBI BLAST showed that none of 
the sequences were similar. 
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SAMPLE ID GENOTYPE NCBI BLAST 
12506785 IB 98% ident ACC# LC037391 
12516336 IIIA 99% ident ACC# KX151461 
12591657 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
12595535 IIIA 99% ident ACC# AB643809 
12600565 IB 99% ident ACC# KU570244 
12604317 IB 99% ident ACC# LC128713 
12608558 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294047 
Table 3.4. Genotyping results of the 2012 samples. 
 
3.3.4. Samples from 2013 - genotypes 
The nested RT-PCR assay detected eight HAV RNA-positive samples. Genotyping identified 
two Genotype IA, four Genotype IB, and two Genotype IIIA samples (Table 3.5). Two 
Genotype IA samples showed strong identity with the same HAV strain (GenBank accession 
number AB909123) and one genotype IB sample showed 100% identity with the GenBank 
HAV strain (GenBank accession number KU570243). This result suggested that the IB samples 
were related. 
SAMPLE ID GENOTYPE NCBI BLAST 
13500071 IIIA 98% ident ACC# LC035013 
13546049 IB 99% ident ACC# KU570243 
13546337 IB 99% ident ACC# KX228694 
13546354 IB 99% ident ACC# KX228694 
13550650 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
13552956 IB 100% ident ACC# KU570243 
13596196 IIIA 99% ident ACC# JQ655151 
13614094 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
Table 3.5. Genotyping results of the 2013 samples. 
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3.3.5. Samples from 2014 - genotypes 
Of the 2014 samples, 18 were shown to be positive for HAV RNA. Ten were Genotype IA, 
five were Genotype IB, and the other three were Genotype IIIA. Table 3.6 shows the 
genotyping results of the samples obtained in 2014. Five Genotype IA samples showed strong 
identity with the same GenBank HAV strain (GenBank Accession number AB909123), 
indicating a possible link. 
SAMPLE ID GENOTYPE NCBI BLAST 
14519833 IIIA 98% ident ACC# AB643811 
14525407 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
14525822 IIIA 98% ident ACC# FJ360734 
14526529 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151416 
14532950 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
14533891 IB 99% ident ACC# KJ436916 
14534279 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151416 
14538320 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
14538322 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
14538699 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294047 
14540396 IA 99% ident ACC# AJ505562 
14540937 IB 98% ident ACC# KJ436916 
14542258 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151416 
14542710 IA 99% ident ACC# AB839692 
14556776 IB 99% ident ACC# KJ436916 
14603166 IIIA 98% ident ACC# LC035013 
14610163 IB 99% ident ACC# KJ436959 
14611219 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
Table 3.6. Genotyping results of the 2014 samples. 
 
3.3.6. Samples from 2015 - genotypes 
Nested RT-PCR identified 57 HAV RNA-positive samples. The genotyping assay showed that 
40 samples were Genotype IA, five were Genotype IB and 12 were Genotype IIIA. The 
genotype of each sample is shown in Table 3.7. Fifteen genotype IA samples were identified 
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as part of the 2015 mixed frozen berries outbreak. All were 100% identical with GenBank 
accession number KX151467. 
SAMPLE ID GENOTYPE NCBI BLAST 
15504286 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15505542 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15508875 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
15509322 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15512513 IIIA 97% ident ACC# AB973882 
15512585 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
15515441 IIIA 99% ident ACC# AY644337 
15515550 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15515882 IB 98% ident ACC# LC035019 
15515967 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
15516065 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15516360 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151463 
15516695 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
15516696 IA 97% ident ACC# AB909123 
15517285 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15517372 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15517373 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294049 
15517517 IIIA 99% ident ACC# LC035013 
15517677 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
15517678 IA 98% ident ACC# KF233562 
15517679 IIIA 99% ident ACC# KX151461 
15517680 IIIA 99% ident ACC# AY644337 
15517961 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
15518676 IIIA 99% ident ACC# AY644337 
15518907 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15519053 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15519070 IIIA 97% ident ACC# KX151461 
15520992 IB 98% ident ACC# KX228694 
15521057 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
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15523640 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15523641 IIIA 98% ident ACC# AB973882 
15523730 IIIA 99% ident ACC# LC035013 
15523731 IB 96% ident ACC# HQ246217 
15524949 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151421 
15525465 IA 99% ident ACC# AJ505562 
15525812 IIIA 98% ident ACC# LC035013 
15526137 IIIA 99% ident ACC# AY644337 
15527438 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
15527613 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15527614 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15528969 IIIA 99% ident ACC# FJ360732 
15529159 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151416 
15529160 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
15535841 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151467 
15538064 IA 99% ident ACC# LC038110 
15538313 IA 97% ident ACC# AB909123 
15538396 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
15542179 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
15556229 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151411 
15557515 IA 97% ident ACC# LC049340 
15559645 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
15568853 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
15581596 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151463 
15588501 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151463 
15590599 IA 99% ident ACC# AB839696 
15592655 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294047 
15598630 IA 99% ident ACC# AB909123 
Table 3.7. Genotyping results of the 2015 samples. 
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Figure 3.11. Hepatitis A virus genotype of samples for each year which were collected during 
the project Part A.  
One hundred and thirty samples from the VIDRL sample bank, received between 2010 and 
2015, were genotyped using the international HAVNET protocol (Figure 3.11). Figure 3.12 
shows the total for each identified genotype. Genotyping revealed that the most common 
genotype was IA, followed by IB and IIIA. There were 71 (55%) Genotype IA, 37 (28%) 
Genotype IB and 22 (27%) Genotype IIIA samples. There was a bias in the genotype 
distribution because representative samples from two large HAV outbreaks included in the 
analysis. There were 14 HAVNET sequences generated using samples from the semi-dried 
tomato outbreak (HAV Genotype IB) and 16 from the 2105 frozen berries outbreak (HAV IA).   
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Figure 3.12. Genotyping results of all the hepatitis A virus samples from 2010 to 2015. 
 
3.3.7. Comparisons between current HAVNET and previous VIDRL genotyping 
In project Part A, 130 HAV RNA-positive serum samples were genotyped according the 
HAVNET method. Of these, 94 had been previously genotyped using VIDRL in-house primer 
sets (OD1). The VIDRL in-house primer set amplified a shorter length of the region comprising 
the VP1/P2A junction of the HAV genome than was detectable using the HAVNET primer set. 
Comparison of the current HAVNET genotyping with the previous VIDRL genotyping results 
revealed that 4 (4.3%) of 94 samples showed differences in genotype/subtype (Figure 3.13). 
 
Figure 3.13. Comparison between HAVNET genotyping and VIDRL in-house genotyping. 
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These different genotypes were identified only from samples collected in 2015, the year in 
which the greatest number of samples were tested. Two samples were classified as Genotype 
IA and IB by VIDRL in-house genotyping, whereas HAVNET genotyping showed both 
samples to be Genotype IIIA. Another sample was also classified as Genotype IA by VIDRL 
in-house genotyping, while HAVNET genotyping identified it as Genotype IB. The fourth 
discrepant result was for a sample identified as Genotype IB by VIDRL in-house genotyping 
but identified as Genotype IA by HAVNET genotyping. The differences may have occurred 
because of the use of different primer sets. The HAVNET primer sets amplify a larger fragment 
of the HAV genome compare with the VIDRL in-house primer. However, the possibility of 
sampling errors during laboratory analysis would appear more likely. In 2015, there were large 
numbers of specimens sent to VIDRL for HAV testing because of an on-going outbreak. 
Therefore, it was possible that some samples were mixed up during experimental procedures, 
resulting in different genotyping results. 
SAMPLE 
ID 
VIDRL  
In-house 
Genotyping 
HAVNET 
Genotyping 
15512513 IA IIIA 
15515441 IB IIIA 
15515882 IA IB 
15598630 IB IA 
Table 3.8. Genotyping result differences between HAVNET and VIDRL genotyping. 
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Figure 3.14. Different genotyping results each year between HAVNET and VIDRL 
genotyping. 
 
3.4. Hepatitis A Virus Sequence Database 
Identifying the source of HAV infection is challenging, largely due to the long incubation 
period. Epidemiological investigation, the most common method used, sometimes cannot 
identify the source of an HAV infection. One of the options is to compare HAV sequences 
from the current case(s) with the previous HAV infections. The current project aimed to 
establish a molecular database of local HAV sequences which should useful for investigating 
the source of HAV infections.  
The HAV sequences were compiled and stored as references to establish a molecular and 
epidemiological database with Geneious R7 software. A total of 130 FASTA files of the 
HAVNET HAV sequences were converted into the local BLAST database. Several sequences 
from the VIDRL in-house genotyping were also uploaded into the database to cover the 
samples that did not have sufficient volume for HAVNET genotyping. 
Phylogenetic analysis performed on the HAV sequences identified 24 genetically-related 
clusters, which included the representative samples from the 2009 semi-dried tomato outbreak, 
the 2015 frozen berries outbreak, and several smaller outbreaks (Table 3.9). An earlier 
sequence from each cluster was chosen as the index case, where possible. All the unique HAV 
sequences, including the sequences from the index cases of each outbreak, were used as 
reference sequences in the BLAST database. Sequences from all new cases could be queried 
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against this database to identify any previous relatedness. As before, the first two numbers of 
the laboratory sample identification number identify the year of sample receipt. 
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Cluster ID aSample ID Primers In Database % Match (compared to index) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) - OD1 Y XX XX index 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 09576649 HAVNET   99.6% (1/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 09580834 OD1   100% (223 nt) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10510006 HAVNET   99.7% (1/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10500706 HAVNET   99.7% (1/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10504427 HAVNET   99.7% (1/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10505052 HAVNET   99.7% (1/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10505053 HAVNET   99.7% (1/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10505904 HAVNET   99.7% (1/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10506946 OD1   100% (270nt) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10508904 OD1   100% (270nt) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10510005 HAVNET   99.7% (1/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10510007 HAVNET   99.3% (2/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10513587 HAVNET   99.7% (1/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10552678 OD1   100% (270nt) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10552679 OD1   100% (270nt) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 10553352 HAVNET   99.7% (1/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 11572975 HAVNET   99.7% (1/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) 12591657 HAVNET   99.7% (1/298 nt diff) 
2009 Sundried Tomato (IB) Count 19       
2009 Cluster A (IA) 09593805 OD1   100% (270nt) From Tas 
2009 Cluster A (IA) 11512324 HAVNET Y index 
2009 Cluster A (IA) Count 2       
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2009 Cluster B (IA) 09598234 OD1   99.6% (1/269 nt diff) from NSW 
2009 Cluster B (IA) 10547815 HAVNET   99.8% (1/455 nt diff) 
2009 Cluster B (IA) 15508875 HAVNET Y index 
2009 Cluster B (IA) 15516695 HAVNET   100% 
2009 Cluster B (IA) 15538396 HAVNET   99.6% (2/460 nt diff) 
2009 Cluster B (IA) 15559645 HAVNET   100% 
2009 Cluster B (IA) 15568853 HAVNET   100% 
2009 Cluster B (IA) Count 7       
2009 Cluster D (IB) 09526968 OD1 Y index (270nt) 
2009 Cluster D (IB) 11531186 HAVNET   99.6% (1/270 nt diff) 
2009 Cluster D (IB) Count 2       
2010 Cluster A (IA) 15517677 HAVNET Y index 
2010 Cluster A (IA) 10512388 HAVNET   99.8% (1/451 nt diff, mixed nt) from NSW 
2010 Cluster A (IA) 14525407 HAVNET   99.6% (2/461 nt diff) 
2010 Cluster A (IA) 14538320 HAVNET   99.8% (1 mixed nt diff) 
2010 Cluster A (IA) 14539308 OD1   100% (262 nt) 
2010 Cluster A (IA) 14538322 HAVNET   100% 
2010 Cluster A (IA) 14539740 OD1   99.6% (1/275 nt diff) 
2010 Cluster A (IA) 14611219 HAVNET   99.8% (1 mixed nt diff) 
2010 Cluster A (IA) 15512585 HAVNET   100% 
2010 Cluster A (IA) 15515967 HAVNET   99.8% (1/462 nt diff) 
2010 Cluster A (IA) 15517433 OD1   99.6% (268nt) 
2010 Cluster A (IA) Count 11       
2010 NSW Cluster (IA) 10500316 OD1   100% (271 nt) 
2010 NSW Cluster (IA) 10502255 HAVNET Y index 
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2010 NSW Cluster (IA) 10506674 OD1   100% 
2010 NSW Cluster (IA) 10507512 HAVNET   100% 
2010 NSW Cluster (IA) 10507513 OD1   100% 
2010 NSW Cluster (IA) 10507514 OD1   100% 
2010 NSW Cluster (IA) 10510798 OD1   100% 
2010 NSW Cluster (IA) 10514731 OD1   100% 
2010 NSW Cluster (IA) Count 8       
2010 QLD-NSW Cluster (IA) 10512086 HAVNET Y index 
2010 QLD-NSW Cluster (IA) 10512785 OD1   99.8% (1/452 nt diff) 
2010 QLD-NSW Cluster (IA) Count 2       
2010 VIC Cluster (IB) 10507079 HAVNET Y index 
2010 VIC Cluster (IB) 10510419 HAVNET   100% 
2010 VIC Cluster (IB) 10510850 HAVNET   100% 
2010 VIC Cluster (IB) 10510851 OD1   100% (270 nt) 
2010 VIC Cluster (IB) 10542099 HAVNET   100% 
2010 VIC Cluster (IB) 10507078 HAVNET   99.8% (1/463 nt diff) 
2010 VIC Cluster (IB) Count 6       
2011 Cluster A (IA) 11605864 HAVNET Y  
2011 Cluster A (IA) 15527438 HAVNET    2/467 nt different (99.6% identical) 
2011 Cluster A (IA) Count 2       
2012 Cluster A(IB) 12600565 HAVNET Y index 
2012 Cluster A(IB) 12608558 HAVNET   100% 
2012 Cluster A(IB) 13530721 OD1   100% (270 nt) 
2012 Cluster A(IB) 13546049 HAVNET   99.5% (2/433nt diff, mixed nt's) 
2012 Cluster A(IB) 13552956 HAVNET   100% 
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2012 Cluster A(IB) Count 5       
2013 Cluster A (IA) 13517431 OD1 Y index 
2013 Cluster A (IA) 13524486 OD1   100% (271 nt) 
2013 Cluster A (IA) Count 2       
2013 Cluster C (IA) 13614094 HAVNET Y index 
2013 Cluster C (IA) 14532950 HAVNET   100% 
2013 Cluster C (IA) Count 2       
2014 Cluster A (IA) 14514605 OD1   99.7% (1/333 nt diff) 
2014 Cluster A (IA) 14526529 HAVNET   99.8% (1/443 nt diff, mixed nt) 
2014 Cluster A (IA) 14534279 HAVNET Y index 
2014 Cluster A (IA) 14542258 HAVNET   99.8% (1/455 nt diff) 
2014 Cluster A (IA) Count 4       
2014 Cluster B (IA) 14508051 OD1   100% (271 nt) 
2014 Cluster B (IA) 14516838 OD1 Y index 
2014 Cluster B (IA) Count 2       
2014 Cluster C (IA) 14521504 VP1 Y index 
2014 Cluster C (IA) 14532950 VP1   100% (248 nt) 
2014 Cluster C (IA) Count 2       
2014 Cluster D (IB) 14532184 OD1   100% 
2014 Cluster D (IB) 14527167 OD1   100% 
2014 Cluster D (IB) 14556776 HAVNET Y index 
2014 Cluster D (IB) 14533891 HAVNET   100% 
2014 Cluster D (IB) 14540937 HAVNET   100% 
2014 Cluster D (IB) Count 5       
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2014 Cluster E (IA) 14578576 OD1   100% (246 nt) 
2014 Cluster E (IA) 15525465 HAVNET Y index 
2014 Cluster E (IA) Count 2       
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 
NZ-
ESR_15NV0801 
-   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15504286 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15505542 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15509322 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15513393 HAVNET Y 100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15515550 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15516065 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15517285 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15517372 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15518907 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15519053 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15521057 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15523640 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15527613 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15527614 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15535841 HAVNET   99.8% (1/449 nt diff, 1 mixed nt) 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15542179 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) Count 17       
2015 Cluster A (IA) 15517961 HAVNET Y 100% 
2015 Cluster A (IA) 15529160 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Cluster A (IA) Count 2       
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2015 Cluster B (IA) 15527438 HAVNET Y index 
2015 Cluster B (IA) 15598630 HAVNET   99.8% (1/464 nt diff) 
2015 Cluster B (IA) Count 2       
2015 Cluster C (IA) 15516360 HAVNET   99.8% (1/464nt diff) 
2015 Cluster C (IA) 15581596 HAVNET   99.8% (1/464nt diff) - identical to 15588501 
2015 Cluster C (IA) 15588501 HAVNET   99.8% (1/464nt diff) - identical to 15581596 
2015 Cluster C (IA) Count 3       
2015 Cluster D (IA) 15514831 VP1 Y index 
2015 Cluster D (IA) 15556702 VP1   100% 
2015 Cluster D (IA) Count 2       
2015 Cluster E (IA) 15516696 HAVNET Y index 
2015 Cluster E (IA) 15557515 HAVNET   99.6% (2/464 nt diff) 
2015 Cluster E (IA) Count 2       
2015 Cluster H (IIIA) 15530248 HAVNET Y index 
2015 Cluster H (IIIA) 15525812 HAVNET   99.8% (1/464 nt diff, 1 mixed nt) 
2015 Cluster H (IIIA) 15526817 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Cluster H (IIIA) 15526818 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Cluster H (IIIA) 15536545 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Cluster H (IIIA) Count 5       
Table 3.9. Clustering results of the HAV samples in Part A of the project by Geneious R7 
Y: index case of the clusters. 
a The first two numbers indicate the year the sample was received. 
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The local database comprised various samples sequences which included four clusters from 
2009, four from 2010, one from 2011, one from 2012, two in 2013, five in 2014, and seven in 
2015. For some clusters, sequences which were amplified using the VIDRL in-house 
(designated OD1) primer set were used as the index case, as no further sample was available 
for HAVNET sequencing. Two large clusters belonging to the 2009 semi-dried tomato and 
2015 frozen berries outbreak with 19 (14 HAVNET sequences and the remainder with the in-
house OD1 primer set) and 17 sequences, respectively. For the semi-dried tomato cluster, the 
OD1 sequence was used as the index case. Comparisons showed one nucleotide difference in 
identity compared with sequences using the HAVNET primers. The 2015 frozen berries 
outbreak consisted of 17 sequences. Sample 15513393 was the first case recognised as part of 
the outbreak, and was used as an index case.  One sample showed 99.8% (one nucleotide 
difference) homology with the index case with the other 15 showed 100% identity. One 
sequence (NZ-ESR_15NV0801) was sent as a text file to VIDRL as a query to determine if it 
was related to HAV from the Australian frozen berries outbreak. 
Another cluster, designated 2010 Cluster A, had 11 genetically linked sequences. Samples 
included three from the one family in country Victoria but there was no clear link with the other 
cases which included four from New South Wales (NSW) and two from Melbourne. Most of 
the other clusters consisted of 2 – 8 patient HAV sequences. They included cases from shared 
geographic locations, from households, and from patients with a similar travel history.  
Although sequences were grouped within the same cluster, not all showed 100% identity with 
the index case. Sequences were considered as similar and grouped into the same cluster if they 
showed < two nucleotide differences. 
This part of the project was successfully completed with a substantial number of HAV 
sequences being generated from HAV RNA-positive samples retrieved from the VIDRL 
sample bank. These HAVNET sequences were stored in a customized BLAST database and 
phylogenetic analysis showed a large number of clusters, several of which had been previously 
recognised. The sequence compilation showed that it was possible to identify the relationships 
between HAV cases, included those which were not identified by epidemiological 
investigations. Prospectively collected samples shown to be HAV RNA-positive can now be 
sequenced with the HAVNET primer set and queried against the database.   
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3.5. Discussion 
In this Part A of the project, a total of 144 samples were genotyped. Although all the samples 
had previously been shown to be HAV RNA-positive, 14 samples (10%) showed negative 
results on the HAVNET nested RT-PCR. RNA degradation was probably the main cause of 
the negative results.77 The samples were received between 2010 and 2015 and may have 
experienced a number of freeze and thaw cycles before being retrieved for this project. Another 
possibility is that the HAVNET primer set may be less sensitive for amplifying the HAV RNA; 
the PCR product generated by the HAVNET primers is substantially larger (approx. 200 
nucleotides) than that amplified by the previous in-house VP1/P2A primers. 
Sanger sequencing was performed on the 130 nested RT-PCR positive samples to determine 
HAV genotype. The results showed that only three genotypes/subtypes were identified among 
the VIDRL samples, there being 71 HAV IA (55%), 37 IB (28%) and 22 IIIA (17%). Several 
studies have shown that the common genotypes affecting humans are Genotypes IA, IB and 
IIIA, with Genotypes I and III being the most prevalent genotypes isolated from humans.2,36 
Among those genotypes, Genotype IA is the most common, consistent with what was found in 
this project.36 
The comparison between HAVNET genotyping and VIDRL in-house genotyping identified 
differences in four of the genotyping results. Two samples were identified as Genotype IA by 
the VIDRL in-house genotyping whereas the HAVNET genotyping showed one of them to be 
Genotype IIIA and the other Genotype IB. Another two samples were identified as Genotype 
IB by the original VIDRL genotyping, but HAVNET genotyping identified them as Genotypes 
IIIA and IA, respectively. 
There is data to suggest that determining genetic relatedness among HAV strains using 
subgenomic regions is suboptimal. As described by Vaughan et al.,80 analysis of three different 
HAV subgenomic regions, which are commonly used for molecular tracking of HAV 
transmission, showed that none identified the HAV outbreak strains as accurately as whole 
genome sequencing. A comparison of the respective phylogenetic trees of the subgenomic 
regions with the whole genome phylogenetic tree showed inconsistency. They also analysed a 
longer region encoding the 3’-end of VP1 through most of P2C, which showed a clearer 
separation of the HAV strains. Nevertheless, phylogenetic trees constructed using this region 
and the whole genome did not match completely, indicating that the whole genome sequencing 
offered a more compete characterization of the HAV strains.80 
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A similar situation may have occurred with the VIDRL in-house genotyping and HAVNET 
genotyping. HAVNET primer sets amplify a longer fragment than the VIDRL in-house primers 
and the HAVNET genotyping may have resulted in a clearer separation of the outbreak strain. 
However, as the sequence amplified by the two primers sets do overlap, the likelihood of 
discriminating the samples into different genotypes or subtypes is unlikely and the more 
probable explanation is that the samples were mixed up during one of the many steps in 
laboratory analysis. Unfortunately, the retrieved samples did not have sufficient volume for 
repeat testing to determine which of the genotyping assays had the correct result. 
Given the HAVNET VP1/P2A junction primer set73 is recognised worldwide, it was decided 
to establish a local database of HAV sequences determined using these primers.  Such a HAV 
database would permit not only real-time tracking of potential outbreaks by rapid linking of 
new cases to previous HAV cases, but also to link outbreak-related cases from around the 
world.  The best method for rapid and accurate comparison of new patient HAV sequences 
against a large collection of nucleotide sequences is the BLAST algorithm. Thus, a custom 
BLAST database was established within the Geneious software platform with all the unique 
HAV sequences, including sequences from the index cases of each outbreak, determined from 
patient samples received at VIDRL from 2010.  The number of unique HAV sequences in this 
database is close to 200 at December 2017. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PART B: HEPATITIS A VIRUS GENOTYPING – PROSPECTIVELY COLLECTED 
SAMPLES 
 
4.1. Sample Collection 
Project Part B was a prospective study of the serum samples shown to be HAV RNA-positive. 
HAV RNA testing was part of routine diagnostic testing performed at VIDRL. The samples 
were patient sera which had been received between January 2016 and December 2017. They 
were initially tested by the commercially available RealStar assay (Altona Diagnostic), which 
is a real-time PCR assay for the qualitative detection of HAV RNA. The samples shown to be 
HAV RNA-positive were then tested by nested RT-PCR using the HAVNET primers and, if 
positive, sequenced using the Sanger protocol. 
A total of 195 samples were collected during this part of the project. These samples consisted 
of 47 samples from 2016 and 148 samples in 2017. They came from several States in Australia 
including New South Wales (NSW), Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia. Besides 
the Australian samples, others from overseas were received in 2017. These were sent from Laos 
PDR (People’s Democratic Republic) to VIDRL, the regional WHO Collaborating Centre for 
Viral Hepatitis. 
 
4.2. Nested RT-PCR Assay 
Serum samples shown to be HAV RNA-positive were amplified by nested RT-PCR using the 
HAVNET primer set by the same method used during Part A of the project. Quality control 
was monitored by three controls, with a negative, a sequence-positive and non-template 
control. The expected product size of the RT- (first round) PCR was 614 bp, and the nested 
(second round) PCR was 520 bp band. 
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Figure 4.1. Nested RT-PCR results of several samples from 2016 (lanes 2 – 11). A: first 
round PCR (RT-PCR); B: second round PCR (nested-PCR); Lane 1: DNA marker ladder; 
Lanes 2 – 11: patient serum samples; Lane 12: negative control; Lane 13: sequence-
positive control; Lane 14: non-template control. 
 
Figure 4.2. Nested RT-PCR results of several samples from 2017 (lanes 2 – 5). A: first 
round PCR (RT-PCR); B: second round PCR (nested-PCR); Lane 1: DNA marker; Lanes 
2 – 5: patient serum samples; Lane 6: negative control; Lane 7: non-template control; 
Lane 8: sequence-positive control. 
The nested RT-PCR was carried out on a total of 47 samples from 2016. There were 44 samples 
showing positive results with three negative samples. Among the 148 samples from 2017, 144 
were PCR positive, and four were negative. All diagnostic samples had detectable HAV RNA 
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by the RealStar commercial assay. Therefore, they were expected to show positive results when 
tested by the HAVNET nested RT-PCR assay. However, there were several conditions which 
may cause the occurrence of the negative results. These conditions would be similar to what 
was found with Part A, except any RNA degradation was unlikely because the Part B samples 
were current diagnostic samples which were more recently received by VIDRL. Figure 4.3 
shows the positive and negative samples in 2016 and 2017.  
 
Figure 4.3. The nested RT-PCR results of the HAV samples which were collected in Part B. 
 
4.3. Hepatitis A Virus Genotyping Assay 
The nested RT-PCR positive samples were sequenced using the same protocols as for Part A 
of the project. The sequences were analysed using the BLAST algorithm against nucleotide 
sequences within the GenBank database to identify the genotypes. 
 
4.3.1. Samples from 2016 – genotypes 
A total of 44 samples from 2016 were sequenced. Genotyping showed that 19 samples were 
Genotype IA, ten samples were Genotype IB, and 15 samples were Genotype IIIA. Table 4.1 
shows the genotype of each sample and the NCBI BLAST search result. 
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SAMPLE ID GENOTYPE NCBI BLAST 
16500691 IIIA 97% ident ACC# AB973882 
16501161 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
16502004 IIIA 97% ident ACC# FJ360731 
16502308 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294047 
16503545 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
16503546 IB 99% ident ACC# KX228694 
16504338 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151402 
16504700 IIIA 98% ident ACC# JQ655151 
16505790 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294047 
16505792 IIIA 99% ident ACC# LC035013 
16506549 IA 99% ident ACC# LC036572 
16507157 IB 98% ident ACC# LC037391 
16507317 IB 99% ident ACC# KJ436970 
16508227 IB 98% ident ACC# AB973882 
16518951 IA 95% ident ACC# HG798857 
16518972 IA 99% ident ACC# JN873912 
16518973 IA 98% ident ACC# HG798860 
16525912 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
16527639 IB 99% ident ACC# KU570243 
16528725 IIIA 98% ident ACC# KX151461 
16530504 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151421 
16540096 IB 97% ident ACC# KY003229 
16540151 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
16546358 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
16547879 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
16549920 IA 97% ident ACC# KC182588 
16553457 IIIA 99% ident ACC# KX151412 
16554082 IIIA 99% ident ACC# LC035013 
16556743 IIIA 99% ident ACC# LC035013 
16558552 IIIA 97% ident ACC# KX151409 
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16558554 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294047 
16571294 IIIA 98% ident ACC# FJ360734 
16579238 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151463 
16579255 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151428 
16584751 IA 99% ident ACC# AJ505562 
16584871 IIIA 99% ident ACC# FJ360732 
16597057 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151430 
16598933 IA 99% ident ACC# AB839692 
16599348 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294047 
16599874 IB 99% ident ACC# AY294047 
16602046 IA 99% ident ACC# HG798832 
16602272 IIIA 99% ident ACC# LC035013 
16605367 IIIA 99% ident ACC# LC035013 
16606058 IIIA 99% ident ACC# LC035013 
 
Table 4.1. Hepatitis A Virus Genotypes of the 2016 samples. The similarity between each 
HAV sample sequence and the strain from the GenBank database are shown. 
  
4.3.2. Samples from 2017 - genotypes 
A total of 144 samples were genotyped between January and December 2017. Table 4.2 shows 
that 117 samples were Genotype IA, five samples were Genotype IB, and 22 samples were 
Genotype IIIA. 
SAMPLE ID GENOTYPE NCBI BLAST 
17508056 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
17508058 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
17508828 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
17509061 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
17509212 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
17510500 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
17510604 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
17510679 IA 98% ident ACC# AB909123 
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17525733 IIIA 99% ident ACC# JQ655151 
17525878 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151422 
17527392 IIIA 99% ident ACC# FJ360734 
17530532 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151422 
17530966 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151422 
17531745 IA 99% ident ACC# KX151422 
17538014 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
17540507 IIIA 98% ident ACC # FJ360732 
17545006 IIIA 98% ident ACC # FJ360734 
17545637 IIIA 99% ident ACC # AY644337 
17545719 IIIA 98% ident ACC # AB973882 
17545720 IA 99% ident ACC # LT796556 
17543506 IIIA 98% ident ACC# FJ360734 
17547676 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
17547677 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
17548950 IIIA 98% ident ACC # FJ360734 
17549395 IA 99% ident ACC # KX151421 
17549396 IB 98% ident ACC # KX228694 
17549914 IA 98% ident ACC # EU526088 
17550188 IA 100% ident ACC # KX151467 
17550294 IA 100% ident ACC # KX151485 
17554901 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151467 
17555921 IA 99% ident ACC# KU570287 
17556749 IIIA 98% ident ACC# FJ360732 
17556755 IIIA 99% ident ACC# KX151412 
17556340 IA 100% ident ACC #KX151416 
17558153 IA 99% ident ACC #KX151440 
17558201 IIIA 98% ident ACC #FJ360734 
17559089 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17560142 IIIA 98% ident ACC #FJ360732 
17558538 IA 99% ident ACC #KX151468 
17558539 IA 99% ident ACC #KX151468 
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17558540 IA 99% ident ACC #KX151468 
17558543 IA 99% ident ACC #KX151468 
17558545 IA 99% ident ACC #KX151468 
17558546 IA 99% ident ACC #KX151468 
17558547 IA 99% ident ACC #KX151468 
17558551 IA 99% ident ACC #KX151468 
17558554 IA 99% ident ACC #EF207320 
17558557 IA 99% ident ACC #EF207320 
17558541 IA 99% ident ACC # KX151468 
17558542 IA 99% ident ACC # KX151468 
17558544 IA 99% ident ACC # KX151468 
17558548 IA 99% ident ACC # KX151468 
17558549 IA 99% ident ACC # KX151468 
17558550 IA 99% ident ACC # KX151468 
17558552 IA 99% ident ACC #EF207320 
17562098 IA 97% ident ACC #JQ425480 
17562103 IA 97% ident ACC #JQ425480 
17562859 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17562978 IA 99% ident ACC #KX151416 
17558553 IA 99% ident ACC #EF207320 
17558555 IA 99% ident ACC #EF207320 
17558556 IA 99% ident ACC #EF207320 
17558558 IA 99% ident ACC #EF207320 
17558559 IA 99% ident ACC #EF207320 
17558560 IA 99% ident ACC #EF207320 
17565203 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17565440 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17565744 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17566189 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17566654 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17566753 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17567083 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
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17562103 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17567680 IIIA 98% ident ACC #AB643811 
17569291 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17569772 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17571355 IA 99% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17571470 IA 100% ident ACC #KX151485 
17571536 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17571537 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17571538 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17572364 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17572385 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17573458 IA 99% ident ACC #KX151468 
17573708 IA 100% ident ACC #KX151485 
17574323 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17574548 IA 97% ident ACC #JQ425480 
17575419 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17575445 IIIA 99% ident ACC #FJ360734 
17576280 IA 99% ident ACC #LT96556 
17576851 IIIA 99% ident ACC #JQ655151 
17576072 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17576538 IA 100% ident ACC #KX151485 
17577901 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17578588 IA 99% ident ACC #MF805897 
17578669 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17579016 IA 98% ident ACC #AJ505562 
17579944 IB 97% ident ACC #LC037391 
17580030 IA 99% ident ACC #MF805896 
17580439 IA 99% ident ACC #MF805896 
17580910 IA 99% ident ACC #AB618530 
17581560 IA 100% ident ACC #MF805883 
17582747 IA 96% ident ACC #KJ436942 
17583499 IA 99% ident ACC #MF805896 
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17584399 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17584949 IA 100% ident ACC# MF805883 
17585416 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17585615 IIIA 98% ident ACC# JQ655151 
17585616 IIIA 99% ident ACC# EU011791 
17586439 IIIA 99% ident ACC# KY292308 
17586441 IIIA 98% ident ACC# FJ360732 
17587177 IA 100% ident ACC# KY292291 
17587213 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17587419 IA 99% ident ACC# MF805896 
17587408 IA 100% ident ACC# MF805883 
17587410 IA 99% ident ACC# KY292289 
17588052 IA 99% ident ACC# MF805896 
17588762 IIIA 98% ident ACC# JQ655151 
17589228 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17589265 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17589660 IB 99% ident ACC# KU570243 
17590032 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17590106 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17591362 IB 98% ident ACC# KU570243 
17590951 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17592954 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17591361 IIIA 99% ident ACC# AY644337 
17592618 IA 100% ident ACC# MF805883 
17591569 IA 99% ident ACC# MF805896 
17592774 IA 98% ident ACC# KJ427799 
17591330 IA 99% ident ACC# MF805896 
17592351 IA 99% ident ACC# MF805896 
17591360 IB 98% ident ACC# KU570243 
17591108 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17594181 IA 100% ident ACC# MF805883 
17594240 IA 100% ident ACC# MF805883 
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17594241 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17594447 IA 100% ident ACC# MF805883 
17594713 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17595319 IIIA 98% ident ACC# FJ360732 
17596228 IA 99% ident ACC# MF805896 
17596369 IA 100% ident ACC# KX151485 
17596506 IA 100% ident ACC# MF805896 
17597050 IA 100% ident ACC# MF805883 
17597060 IA 100% ident ACC# MF805872 
Table 4.2. Hepatitis A Virus Genotypes of the 2017 samples. Similarities between each HAV 
sample sequence and the strain from the GenBank database are shown. 
Overall, in project Part B, a total of 188 samples were collected and genotyped. Figure 4.4 
shows that 136 samples were Genotype IA, 15 were Genotype IB, and 37 were Genotype IIIA. 
The results show that Genotype IA is the most common cause of hepatitis A infections in 
Australia. 
 
Figure 4.4. Genotyping results of the project Part B (Total samples from 2016 and 2017) 
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72%
15
8%
37
20%
Hepatitis A Virus Genotype
IA
IB
IIIA
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4.4. Phylogenetic Tree Analysis 
A total of 188 HAVNET sequences derived from Part A and Part B were compiled and 
processed to generate a phylogenetic tree to assess their genetic relatedness. Multiple sequences 
were aligned and trimmed to ensure consistent lengths using the BioEdit v7.0 software.81 A 
maximum likelihood (ML) phylogenetic tree was inferred using the Mega6 software82 and the 
nucleotide substitution model used to estimate evolutionary distances between sequences was 
chosen based on the model testing algorithm implemented in Mega6. The substitution model 
with the lowest BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) score was considered as the best for this 
set of HAV sequences. Table 4.3 shows model testing results, the best model being the Tamura-
Nei plus G and I (TN93+G+I).  The ‘G’ parameter of the substitution model allows the 
measurement of the evolutionary rate variation among sites, and was modelled by a discrete 
Gamma distribution with 5 rate categories.  
The ‘I’ parameter allows the proportion of invariable sites among the HAV sequences to be 
taken into account during evolutionary distance estimations. Robustness of the ML 
phylogenetic tree generate was assessed using a dataset of 1000 pseudo-replicates generated 
with the bootstrap method, and clusters with a bootstrap value of >75% were considered robust. 
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Table 4.3.  
Model testing results performed using Mega6. 
The BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) scoring system was used to select the substitution 
model for phylogenetic analysis. The substitution model with the lowest BIC score was considered 
to have included the optimal set of parameters needed to accurately estimate evolutionary 
distances between the HAV sequences analysed in this study. Substitution models: GTR (General 
Time Reversible); HKY (Hasegawa-Kishino-Yano); TN93 (Tamura-Nei); T92 (Tamura 3-
parameter); K2 (Kimura 2-parameter); JC (Jukes-Cantor).82 
Model #Param BIC AICc lnL Invariant Gamma R Freq A Freq T Freq C Freq G A=>T A=>C A=>G T=>A T=>C T=>G C=>A C=>T C=>G G=>A G=>T G=>C
TN93+G+I 616 12484.53852 6814.820167 -2786.277235 0.536555389 1.255965315 8.95138612 0.348467802 0.249651773 0.153380478 0.248499946 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.24 0.01 0.02 0.39 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.01
TN93+G 615 12490.02724 6829.496224 -2794.631971 n/a 0.205598712 8.865816727 0.348467802 0.249651773 0.153380478 0.248499946 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.4 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.01
T92+G+I 613 12490.79133 6848.635159 -2806.234771 0.539323597 1.131379497 8.838934072 0.299059788 0.299059788 0.200940212 0.200940212 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.01 0.27 0.01 0.01
T92+G 612 12517.58973 6884.621058 -2825.244345 n/a 0.213824182 8.277669104 0.299059788 0.299059788 0.200940212 0.200940212 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.27 0.01 0.27 0.02 0.01
GTR+G+I 619 12525.0698 6827.789756 -2789.711744 0.537137935 1.295147163 7.088626445 0.348467802 0.249651773 0.153380478 0.248499946 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.01 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.01
K2+G+I 612 12530.46542 6897.496749 -2831.68219 0.532816035 1.055823359 8.306496447 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.01
GTR+G 618 12532.62834 6844.535474 -2799.101392 n/a 0.212076544 6.908062434 0.348467802 0.249651773 0.153380478 0.248499946 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.01 0.38 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.01
HKY+G+I 615 12542.43592 6881.904907 -2820.836313 0.530499585 0.942945314 9.5033781 0.348467802 0.249651773 0.153380478 0.248499946 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.23 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.01
K2+G 611 12556.41379 6932.632677 -2850.266752 n/a 0.211384685 7.894593069 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.01
HKY+G 614 12579.69501 6928.351393 -2845.076235 n/a 0.234413209 8.471507733 0.348467802 0.249651773 0.153380478 0.248499946 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.01
TN93+I 615 12589.25328 6928.722269 -2844.244994 0.57660941 n/a 7.982847153 0.348467802 0.249651773 0.153380478 0.248499946 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.02 0.36 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.01
T92+I 612 12602.6017 6969.633027 -2867.75033 0.577868852 n/a 8.176130511 0.299059788 0.299059788 0.200940212 0.200940212 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.27 0.01 0.27 0.02 0.01
GTR+I 618 12620.12853 6932.035667 -2842.851489 0.576645409 n/a 8.02759921 0.348467802 0.249651773 0.153380478 0.248499946 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.36 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.01
K2+I 611 12651.14784 7027.366726 -2897.633776 0.577868852 n/a 7.590176132 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.01
HKY+I 614 12674.34854 7023.004921 -2892.402999 0.576715802 n/a 8.0245829 0.348467802 0.249651773 0.153380478 0.248499946 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.01
JC+G+I 611 13165.79271 7542.0116 -3154.956213 0.523781227 1.249391408 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
JC+G 610 13189.27844 7574.684942 -3172.309454 n/a 0.240359559 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
T92 611 13243.45897 7619.677856 -3193.789341 n/a n/a 5.898240958 0.299059788 0.299059788 0.200940212 0.200940212 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.26 0.01 0.26 0.02 0.01
TN93 614 13257.21373 7605.870111 -3183.835594 n/a n/a 5.910094659 0.348467802 0.249651773 0.153380478 0.248499946 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.2 0.02 0.02 0.32 0.02 0.2 0.02 0.01
K2 610 13262.49271 7647.89921 -3208.916588 n/a n/a 5.844227708 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.02
JC+I 610 13262.73469 7648.141195 -3209.037581 0.576705329 n/a 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
GTR 617 13287.46111 7608.555471 -3182.128153 n/a n/a 5.923489275 0.348467802 0.249651773 0.153380478 0.248499946 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.2 0.01 0.02 0.32 0.02 0.2 0.01 0.01
HKY 613 13309.62372 7667.467546 -3215.650964 n/a n/a 5.903185996 0.348467802 0.249651773 0.153380478 0.248499946 0.02 0.01 0.21 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.02 0.3 0.02 0.01
JC 609 13843.29179 8237.885961 -3504.926506 n/a n/a 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
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Besides the patient sample sequences, HAV sequences from GenBank were used as genotype 
references in the phylogenetic analysis. Table 4.4 shows the reference strain for each HAV 
genotype. The index case sequences of the semi-dried tomato (09578076) and frozen berries 
outbreak (15513393) were also added to the data. During 2017, an HAV outbreak occurred in 
Europe which was associated with men who have sex with men (MSM). The reference 
sequences of the outbreak were included in the phylogenetic data. 
Genotype HAV Strain GenBank Accession No. 
IA GBM-wt X75215 
IB HM-175-wt M14707 
IIA CF53 AY644676 
IIB SLF88 AY644670 
IIIA NOR-21 AJ299464 
IIIB HAJ85-1F AB279735 
Table 4.4. HAV genotype references. GBM-wt (X75215) is a Genotype IA strain from 
Germany. HM-175-wt (M14707) is a Genotype IB strain from Australia. CF53 (AY644676) 
is a Genotype IIA strain from France. SLF88 (AY644670) is a Genotype IIB strain from 
Sierra Leone. NOR-21 (AJ299464) is a Genotype IIIA strain from Norway. HAJ85-1F 
(AB279735) is a Genotype IIIB strain from Japan. 
Figure 4.5 shows the ML phylogenetic tree generated for the HAV sequences determined from 
patient samples collected between 2010 and 2017. The ML tree showed that most of the HAV 
outbreaks occurred during this period were Genotype IA. It also showed that there was a close 
relationship between the strain from the frozen berries outbreak and the strain from MSM 
outbreak Cluster 3.  
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Figure 4.5:  Maximum likelihood phylogenetic tree of the HAV sequences studied.  Evolutionary distances between the HAV sequences were 
estimated using the TN93+G+I substitution model, and robustness of the clusters was assessed with 1000 bootstrap replicates. Bootstrap values 
>60% were shown, and clusters supported with bootstrap values of >75% are considered robust. ●: unrelated sequences; ●: Laos outbreak 
Cluster B; ●: MSM outbreak Cluster 2; ●: Laos outbreak Cluster A; ●: MSM outbreak Cluster 3; ●: Berry outbreak; ●: MSM outbreak Cluster 
1; ●: Semi-dried tomato outbreak; ▲: HAV genotype references
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4.5. Genetic Relationships Between Prospectively and Retrospectively Tested Samples 
In Part B, samples were prospectively tested with the commercial RealStar assay for the 
presence of HAV RNA as part of the diagnostic assays performed at VIDRL. In this part of the 
project, RT-PCR was performed using the HAVNET primers on all the HAV RNA-positive 
samples, and the cDNA amplicons generated were then sequenced to determine the viral 
genotype and to assess their genetic relationships with previous HAV cases. To perform the 
latter, the viral sequence of each prospectively identified HAV case was queried against the 
HAV BLAST database which was established in project Part A with unique viral sequences 
being determined from retrospective HAV cases, and using cases diagnosed between 2010 and 
2015, as reference sequences. The BLAST algorithm estimates the identity percentage (% 
Identity; genetic relatedness level) of the query sequence against each of the reference HAV 
sequences in the database, and the result is presented as a list of the reference HAV sequences 
in descending order of “% Identity” to the query sequence.  A query sequence is considered to 
be genetically related to a retrospective HAV case if the two sequences had two or less 
nucleotide difference between them (>99.5%). A total of 24 samples from 2016 and 94 samples 
from 2017 showed genetic relationships with either retrospective HAV cases or between 
themselves. 
 
4.5.1. Samples from 2016 – genetic relationships between HAV cases from previous 
years 
There were 18 HAV sequences from the 2016 samples (Part B) that showed genetic 
relationships with previous HAV sequences derived from 2010 – 2015 samples (Part A). 
Phylogenetic analysis showed that they could be grouped into ten clusters (see Table 4.5). 
Interestingly, three samples from 2016 (number prefix 16) showed 100% identity with 
sequences from the 2015 mixed frozen berries outbreak (2014 Cluster F).  Not all sequences 
from the 2016 samples showed complete homology with the earlier index case, with some 
samples having a mismatch of one or two nucleotides. Table 4.5 shows the relationships 
between 2016 samples and the previous samples. 
Cluster ID 
Sample 
ID 
Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match (compared 
to index) 
2010 Cluster A (IA) 15517677 HAVNET Y index 
2010 Cluster A (IA) 16540151 HAVNET   99.8% (1/462nt diff) 
2010 Cluster A (IA) Count 2       
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2012 Cluster A(IB) 12600565 HAVNET Y index 
2012 Cluster A(IB) 16502308 HAVNET   99.8% (1/441nt diff) 
2012 Cluster A(IB) 16505790 HAVNET   99.8% (1/441nt diff) 
2012 Cluster A(IB) 16558554 HAVNET   99.5% (2/441nt diff) 
2012 Cluster A(IB) 16599348 HAVNET   99.8% (1/441nt diff) 
2012 Cluster A (IB) Count 5       
2013 Cluster B (IA) 13504331 OD1 Y index (270nt) 
2013 Cluster B (IA) 16598933 HAVNET   99.3% (2/272 nt diff) 
2013 Cluster B (IA) Count 2       
2014 Cluster F (IA) 14540396 HAVNET Y index 
2014 Cluster F (IA) 16607190 HAVNET   99.8% (1/417 nt diff) 
2014 Cluster F (IA) Count 2       
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15513393 HAVNET Y 100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 16501161 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 16503545 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 16546358 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 
Count 
4       
2015 Cluster A (IA) 15517961 HAVNET Y 100% 
2015 Cluster A (IA) 16525912 HAVNET   
99.8% (1/464nt 
different) 
2015 Cluster A (IA) Count 2       
2015 Cluster C (IA) 15581596 HAVNET  Y Index  
2015 Cluster C (IA) 16579238 HAVNET  99.8% (1/464nt diff) 
2015 Cluster C (IA) Count 2       
2015 Cluster E (IA) 15516696 HAVNET Y index 
2015 Cluster E (IA) 16613961 HAVNET Y 100% 
2015 Cluster E (IA) Count 2       
2015 Cluster F (IIIA) 15512513 HAVNET Y index 
2015 Cluster F (IIIA) 16500691 HAVNET   99.8% (1/464 nt diff) 
2015 Cluster F (IIIA) Count 2       
2015 Cluster G (IIIA) 15523730 HAVNET Y index 
2015 Cluster G (IIIA) 16505792 HAVNET   
99.6% (2/462 nt diff, 
1 mixed nt) 
2015 Cluster G (IIIA) 16554082 HAVNET   99.8% (1/463 nt diff) 
2015 Cluster G (IIIA) 16602272 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Cluster G (IIIA) Count 4       
Table 4.5. Similarities of the HAV sequences between 2016 cases and previous cases (HAV 
samples from 2010 to 2015). The similarity and nucleotide difference between each sample 
and the index case for each cluster are shown. Y: cluster index case 
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4.5.2. Samples from 2017 – genetic relationships between HAV cases from previous 
years  
Among 2017 samples, ten HAV sequences were found to be genetically related to sequences 
of cases from previous years, and could be grouped into five clusters. One of these clusters 
involved HAV sequences of five cases identified in 2017 and had 100% homology with the 
representative HAV sequence of the mixed frozen berries outbreak which occurred in 2015.  
Of interest, the epidemiological relationship between patients with genetically related HAV 
sequences in two clusters (“2014 Cluster A” and “2015 Cluster C”) was confirmed following 
a check on their clinical histories, and they were found to be returned travellers from the same 
country.  For the 2014 Cluster A, the two sequences were 100% identical even though the 
samples were collected three years apart. This indicates that this strain of HAV has remained 
stable over this time-frame. Table 4.6 shows the similarities between 2017 samples and the 
index case of each cluster.  
Cluster ID Sample ID Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match 
(compared to 
index) 
2009 Cluster C (IA) 09583929 OD1   100% (270nt) 
2009 Cluster C (IA) 17545720 HAVNET Y index 
2009 Cluster C (IA) Count 2       
2014 Cluster A (IA) 14534279 HAVNET Y index 
2014 Cluster A (IA) 17556340 HAVNET   100% 
2014 Cluster A (IA) Count 2       
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15513393 HAVNET Y 100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 17508828 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 17538014 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 17547676 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 17547677 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 17554901 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 
Count 
6       
2015 Cluster C (IA) 15581596 HAVNET  Y Index  
2015 Cluster C (IA) 16579238 HAVNET  
99.8% (1/464nt 
diff) 
2015 Cluster C (IA) 17503347 HAVNET   
99.8% (1/464nt 
diff) 
2015 Cluster C (IA) Count 3       
2015 Cluster E (IA) 15516696 HAVNET Y index 
2015 Cluster E (IA) 17512635 HAVNET   100% 
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2015 Cluster E (IA) Count 2       
2015 Cluster I (IA) 15524949 HAVNET Y index 
2015 Cluster I (IA) 17549395 HAVNET   
99.6% (2/453 nt 
diff) 
2015 Cluster I (IA) Count 2       
Table 4.6. Similarities of the HAV sequences between 2017 cases and cases from 
previous years (2010 to 2015). The similarity and nucleotide difference between each 
sample and index case of each cluster was shown. Y: index cases of the clusters 
 
4.6. Hepatitis A Virus Outbreak Investigation 
The HAV BLAST database was also employed for outbreak investigations. By comparing the 
HAV sequence determined from a patient sample with the reference sequences stored in the 
database, it is possible to rapidly and accurately establish genetic relationships between HAV 
sequences and detect infection clusters. The database is predominantly used to investigate 
relationships between Australian HAV RNA-positive samples, but it was also used to 
investigate HAV outbreak associations of samples sent from Laos PDR. Several Australian 
HAV clusters were recognised by molecular epidemiology. 
 
4.6.1. The mixed frozen berries outbreak 
In Part B, eight samples showed a relationship with the index case of the 2015 mixed frozen 
berries outbreak. Three samples were from 2016 while the other five were from 2017. All the 
samples showed a 100% match with the 2015 index case. It showed that the current diagnostic 
samples (2016 and 2017) were from patients infected by the same HAV strain that caused the 
2015 mixed berries outbreak. However, the three 2016 samples were probably part of the 
original 2015 outbreak. These samples were collected in late 2015 or early 2016 and were sent 
to VIDRL for genotyping and sequence analysis after being shown to be HAV RNA-positive 
by the local laboratory.  
The three 2016 samples came from Western Australia, while the 2017 samples were from 
Victoria (1), South Australia (2) and NSW (2). The two NSW cases were family members. 
Table 4.7 showed the comparison between 2016 – 2017 samples and the index case of the 2015 
mixed frozen berries outbreak. 
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Cluster ID 
Sample 
ID 
Year Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match 
(compared 
to index) 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 15513393 2015 HAVNET Y 100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 16501161 2016 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 16503545 2016 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 16546358 2016 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 17508828 2017 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 17538014 2017 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 17547676 2017 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 17547677 2017 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries (IA) 17554901 2017 HAVNET   100% 
2015 Frozen Berries 
(IA) Count 
9         
Table 4.7. Mixed frozen berries outbreak cluster (2016 and 2017 cases). Comparison between 
the index case (original patient of the 2015 mixed frozen berries outbreak) and HAV case 
sequences from 2016 and 2017 are shown. Y: index case 
The source of food-borne outbreak can be confirmed if the virus detected in the suspected food 
and the sequence was identical to the HAV sequences from the infected patients. In the 2015 
frozen berries cases, the infection source was confirmed by detecting HAV RNA in frozen 
berries samples. Some extracted samples from the recent implicated frozen berries were 
received from the National Measurement Institute (Port Melbourne, Victoria) in June 2017. No 
HAV RNA was detected by the RealStar assay and the samples were also negative by the 
nested RT-PCR assay used for genotyping (results not shown). There may be some inhibitors 
in the specimen which block the PCR reactions, or more likely, the frozen berries samples had 
a low virus titre. 
 
4.6.2. Other Australian clusters 
Among the Part B samples were several HAV clusters which were recognised by molecular 
epidemiology. One cluster identified in early 2017 had seven samples from six patients. The 
initial HAV infection was probably acquired while holidaying in Vanuatu and spread to other 
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family members and their close contacts. It occurred in December 2016 and was called the 
2016 Christmas outbreak (Table 4.8). The results confirmed that HAV infection can be 
acquired by visiting highly endemic countries.2  
Cluster ID Sample ID Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match (compared to 
index) 
2016 Xmas (IA) 17508056 HAVNET Y index 
2016 Xmas (IA) 17510500 HAVNET   100% 
2016 Xmas (IA) 17510604 HAVNET   99.8% (1 mixed nt diff) 
2016 Xmas (IA) 17508058 HAVNET   100% 
2016 Xmas (IA) 17508399(a) HAVNET   99.8% (1 mixed nt diff) 
2016 Xmas (IA) 17509061 HAVNET   99.8% (1 mixed nt diff) 
2016 Xmas (IA) 17509212 HAVNET   99.8% (1 mixed nt diff) 
2016 Xmas (IA) 17510679 HAVNET   100% 
2016 Xmas (IA) 
Count 
8       
Table 4.8. 2016 Christmas cluster. Comparison between index case and the other cases was 
shown. Y: index case; a): same patient (17508058), but a later bleed 
Another cluster from 2017, the R family cluster, was subsequently shown to involve two 
different families. The initial outbreak involved a mother and her two children. Based on the 
chronology of samples, HAV from the initial infection was transmitted to the children’s 
babysitter and subsequently transmitted to two other siblings from another family by the 
babysitter. This cluster demonstrated HAV transmission through person-to-person close 
contact and how the hepatitis A infection can be spread readily. 
Cluster ID  Sample ID Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match 
(compared 
to index) 
2017 R Family Outbreak (IA) 17520701a) HAVNET   100% 
2017 R Family Outbreak (IA) 17522308a) HAVNET   100% 
2017 R Family Outbreak (IA) 17522312a) HAVNET Y index 
2017 R Family Outbreak (IA) 17530532 HAVNET   100% 
2017 R Family Outbreak (IA) 17530966b) HAVNET   100% 
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2017 R Family Outbreak (IA) 17531745b) HAVNET   100% 
2017 R Family Outbreak 
(IA) Count 
6       
Table 4.9. 2017 R Family Outbreak. Comparison between index case and the other samples 
showed 100% identity. Y: index case; a): first family; b): second family 
Another small cluster, comprising only two sequences, was identified in 2017. The Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) could find no common link but both patients were from 
the same country region, suggesting that although molecular investigation can identify the 
relationships between HAV sequences, epidemiological data is required to confirm the 
relationships. Table 4.10 shows the local BLAST results of the Seymour cluster.  
Cluster ID Sample ID Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match 
(compared to 
index) 
2017 Seymour Outbreak (IIIA) 17525733 HAVNET Y index 
2017 Seymour Outbreak (IIIA) 17511381 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Seymour Outbreak 
(IIIA) Count 
2       
Table 4.10. Seymour outbreak. Both samples were received in 2017 and showed 100% 
identity with each other. Y: index case 
 
4.6.3. Local outbreaks with international links 
Given the HAVNET primers are now used globally for HAV outbreak investigations, all the 
HAV sequences determined with these primers can be shared internationally.  The molecular 
epidemiological methodologies used to identify local clusters of HAV infection described to 
date can also be employed to identify local cases that are associated with those reported 
overseas, provided that the HAV sequences of these index cases are also stored in the HAV 
BLAST database. 
A large European HAV outbreak which started in June 2016 was shown to be predominantly 
spread by MSM.83 All cases identified in the study could be phylogenetically grouped into 
three clusters of HAV Genotype IA isolates. The index cases of the three clusters were 
 96 
 
identified as: V16-39450 (MSM-Cluster-1), RIVM-HAV16-090 (MSM-Cluster-2), and V16-
25801 (MSM-Cluster-3). 
In mid-2017, a diagnostic sample was found to be HAV Genotype 1A and the HAV sequence 
obtained had 100% homology with the index case from MSM-Cluster-2, the first HAV case 
associated with the European HAV outbreak 83 in Australia.  
In August 2017, the viral RNA sequence of another HAV-IA positive diagnostic sample was 
found to be genetically related to the index case of MSM-Cluster-1 of the Europe MSM 
outbreak. The HAV sequence determined from the sample had 99.6% homology with the index 
case (V16-39450) but with two nucleotide differences. This HAV sequence was also added to 
the HAV BLAST database and was designated as index case 2 (Index-2). Three more patient 
samples were subsequently received, and sequencing revealed that they too were 100% 
identical to the Index-2 of MSM-Cluster-1. As of December 2017, 38 samples have been 
identified as part of this cluster. Of interest, the HAV sequence of a patient sample (17576072) 
was shown to be three nucleotides different from the Index-1 case, but there was only a 
nucleotide different from the Index-2 of this cluster (Table 4.11). This data suggests the source 
of infection in this case may have been local (a case associated with Index-2), and post infection 
had accumulated a further nucleotide substitution.  
 
Table 4.11. HAV variants included in MSM-Cluster-1 which is part of the large European 
HAV outbreak that predominantly occurred in the men who have sex with men 
population. Listed are nucleotide positions that had variable nucleotides (position 
numbering was based on HAV sequence of Index-I), and the highlighted nucleotides are 
those that differ from the reference HAV sequenced of Index-I. 
Table 4.12 shows the comparison between sequences in the Europe MSM outbreak Cluster 1 
and other genetically related sequences within this HAV cluster. 
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Cluster ID Sample ID Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match 
(compared to 
index) 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
V16-39450 HAVNET Y index-1 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17559089 HAVNET Y 
index-2 - 99.6% 
(2/460 nt diff) to 
index-1 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17562098 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17562103 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17562859 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17565203 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17565440 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17565744 HAVNET Y 
index-3 - 99.8% 
(1/460 nt diff) to 
index-1 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17566189 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17566654 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17566753 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17567083 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17569772 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17571536 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
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2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17571537 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17571538 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17572364 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17574323 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17574548 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17575419 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17569291 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17572385 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17578588 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17578669 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17579016 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17576072 HAVNET Y 
index 4 `- (1/460 
nt diff to 
17502098) 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17577901 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17583499 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17580030 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17580439 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
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2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17587177 HAVNET   
99.7% (1/377nt 
diff) to index-1 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17587419 HAVNET   
1/382 diff to 
index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17587410 HAVNET   
99.7% (1/426 nt 
diff) to index-1 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17588052 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17591330 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17592351 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17591569 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17596228 HAVNET   100% to index-2 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) 
17596506 HAVNET   
99.8% (1/435nt 
diff) to index-1 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 1 (IA) Count 
38       
Table 4.12. Australian cases similar to the Europe MSM outbreak Cluster 1. Comparisons 
between each sequence and index cases, and the nucleotide differences are shown. Y: index 
cases 
During September 2017, two samples were identified as part of the Cluster 2 Europe MSM 
outbreak. These samples had a 100% match with the index case from Europe (RIVM_HAV16-
090) and with each other. As of December 2017, there was a total of 19 sample sequences 
identical to the Europe MSM outbreak Cluster 2, as shown on Table 4.13. 
 
 
 
 100 
 
Cluster ID Sample ID Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match 
(compared to 
index) 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
RIVM-
HAV16-090 
HAVNET Y index 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17522582 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17550294 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17571470 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17573708 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17584399 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17585416 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17576538 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17587213 HAVNET   
100% of 
377nt 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17589228 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17589265 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17590032 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17590106 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17590951 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17591108 HAVNET   100% 
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2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17592954 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17594241 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17594713 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17596369 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
2 (IA) 
17597060 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 2 (IA) Count 
19       
Table 4.13. Australian cases as part of the Europe MSM outbreak Cluster 2. Comparison 
between each sequence and the index case is shown. Y: index case 
Lastly, nine samples were identified where the sequences conformed to the Europe MSM 
outbreak Cluster 3. Two samples were tested in October 2017 and the others were identified 
between November and December. The HAV sequence from the first sample showed a single 
nucleotide difference (99.8% identity) from the index case V16-25801 while the HAV 
sequences from the other samples were a 100% match. Table 4.14 shows the sequences of the 
Europe MSM outbreak Cluster 3. 
Cluster ID 
Sample 
ID 
Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match 
(compared to 
index) 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
3 (IA) 
V16-
25801 
HAVNET Y index 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
3 (IA) 
17576280 HAVNET   
99.8% (1/459 nt 
diff) 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
3 (IA) 
17581560 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
3 (IA) 
17584949 HAVNET   100% 
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2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
3 (IA) 
17587408 HAVNET   100% (450nt) 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
3 (IA) 
17592618 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
3 (IA) 
17594181 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
3 (IA) 
17594240 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
3 (IA) 
17594447 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM Cluster 
3 (IA) 
17597050 HAVNET   100% 
2017_EU-EEU MSM 
Cluster 3 (IA) Count 
9       
Table 4.14. Australian cases as part of the Europe MSM outbreak Cluster 3. Comparisons 
between each sequence and the index case, and the nucleotide differences are shown. Y: 
index case 
Phylogenetic analysis was performed on the HAV sequences from these samples. The ML 
phylogenetic tree was generated using the Tamura plus I (T92+I) model, with 1000 bootstrap 
replicates. The analysis confirmed the HAV sequences studied were of genotype HAV-IA, and 
that the three groups of genetically related HAV sequences identified using the HAV BLAST 
database also clustered with the appropriate sequences of the European index cases with strong 
bootstrap support (99%). 
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Figure 4.6. Maximum Likelihood phylogenetic tree of Australian cases that are associated 
with the Europe Union MSM HAV outbreaks. 
The phylogenetic tree was generated based on Tamura plus I (T92+I) model with 1000 
bootstrap replicates. Values less than 60% were hidden. GBM-wt (GenBank accession no. 
X75215) is a reference sequence for HAV genotype IA. HM-175-wt (GenBank Accession 
no. M14707) is a reference sequence for HAV genotype IB. 
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The identification of the EU MSM outbreak strains in Australia has shown that HAV can be 
easily transmitted locally and also worldwide. The outbreak started in June 2016 in Europe, 
and within a year, related HAV cases were found in Australia. Furthermore, within another six 
months, a total of 66 cases consisting of all three clusters were identified in Australia. One of 
the patients in Cluster 1 was a female which suggested that the hepatitis infections were spread 
outside the MSM group. Furthermore, each cluster was originally found in a specific state and, 
after several months, interstate cases were identified. These findings showed the necessity of 
further investigations to identify the route of transmission among Australian, besides the MSM 
exposure. 
 
4.6.4. International outbreaks 
In July 2017, VIDRL received 24 serum samples from Laos PDR. These samples were 
collected between 2016 and 2017 from apparent separate HAV outbreaks in Laos. The 
members of the WHO Laos team suspected that up to five outbreaks had arisen during these 
times. These outbreaks had occurred in three regions, Xienkhuang Province, Vientiane 
Province and Vientiane Capital. The samples were sent to VIDRL to confirm the diagnosis and 
for genotyping. 
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Sample ID CT Valuea) Region Outbreak No 
17558538 25.32 Xiengkhuang 1 
17558539 28.7 Xiengkhuang 1 
17558540 25.8 Xiengkhuang 2 
17558543 28.85 Xiengkhuang 3 
17558545 29.58 Xiengkhuang 1 
17558546 30.63 Xiengkhuang 1 
17558547 29.03 Xiengkhuang 1 
17558551 28.13 Xiengkhuang 1 
17558541 21.14 Xiengkhuang 1 
17558542 18.28 Xiengkhuang 3 
17558544 32.94 Xiengkhuang 1 
17558548 29.07 Xiengkhuang 1 
17558549 27.75 Xiengkhuang 1 
17558550 27.4 Xiengkhuang 1 
17558554 29.19 Vientiane Capital 4 
17558557 29.49 Vientiane Province 5 
17558552 25.78 Vientiane Capital 4 
17558553 32.53 Vientiane Capital 4 
17558555 26.86 Vientiane Capital 4 
17558556 39.41 Vientiane Province 5 
17558558 22.91 Vientiane Province 5 
17558559 35.51 Vientiane Province 5 
17558560 34.36 Vientiane Province 5 
17558561 38.06 Vientiane Province 5 
Table 4.15. Laos outbreak samples. Based on epidemiological data, the outbreak clusters 
(outbreak 1 to 5) had been identified. a): Cycle threshold based on the RealStar assay 
The outbreak samples were divided over three work sheets and tested by the RealStar assay 
followed by nested RT-PCR and Sanger sequencing. All samples were HAV RNA-positive by 
the RealStar assay, but one of sample was negative in nested RT-PCR and thus could not be 
genotyped. Table 4.15 shows the epidemiology data and the RealStar assay results. A total of 
23 samples were sequenced, and the BLAST search against nucleotide sequences within the 
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GenBank database identified them all to be HAV Genotype IA. BLAST analysis revealed that 
there were only two major HAV strains related to the outbreaks. There were 14 samples 
included in Cluster A and 9 in Cluster B. The molecular analysis narrowed the number of 
outbreak clusters from five to two. It also revealed that Cluster B consisted of two genetically 
similar HAV strains. 
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Figure 4.7. Nested RT-PCR results of the Laos samples by agarose gel electrophoresis. 
Twenty-four Laos outbreak samples were divided into three work sheets. Each work sheet 
included patient samples and three controls (sequence-positive, negative and non-template 
control)  
(i): Work sheet 170807022. Lane 1 is the DNA marker ladder. Lanes 2 – 11 are patient 
samples. Lane 12 is the negative control; Lane 13, the non-template control and Lane 
14, the sequence positive control. 
(ii): Work sheet 170815023. Lane 1 is the DNA marker ladder. Lanes 2 – 8 are patient 
samples. Lane 9 is the negative control; Lane 10, the non-template control and Lane 
11 is the sequence positive control. 
(iii): Work sheet 170817016. Lane 1 is the DNA marker ladder. Lanes 2 – 8 are patient 
samples. Lane 9 is the negative control; Lane 10 the non-template control and Lane 
11 the sequence positive control. 
In Cluster A, the HAV sequences from all samples showed 100% homology. By contrast, in 
Cluster B three of the nine samples showed two nucleotide differences (99.6% identity) from 
the other six. Therefore, Cluster B was divided into Cluster B1 and B2. A search of the local 
BLAST database showed that none of the Laos samples matched any Australian isolates. 
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Cluster ID 
Sample 
ID 
Primers In Database 
% Match (compared to 
index) 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558538 HAVNET Y index 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558539 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558540 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558543 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558545 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558546 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558547 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558551 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558541 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558542 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558544 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558548 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558549 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) 
17558550 HAVNET   100% 
2017 Laos Cluster A 
(IA) Count 
14       
Table 4.16. Local BLAST result of the Laos outbreak Cluster A. All samples showed 100% 
identity with the cluster index case. Y: index case 
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Cluster ID Sample ID Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match Status 
(compared to index) 
2017 Laos Cluster B 
(IA) 
17558554 HAVNET Y index 
2017 Laos Cluster B 
(IA) 
17558557c) HAVNET   2 nt diff 
2017 Laos Cluster B 
(IA) 
17558552 HAVNET   100% (467 bp) 
2017 Laos Cluster B 
(IA) 
17558553 HAVNET   100% (467 bp) 
2017 Laos Cluster B 
(IA) 
17558555 HAVNET   100% (467 bp) 
2017 Laos Cluster B 
(IA) 
17558556 c) HAVNET   99.6% (2/467nt diff) 
2017 Laos Cluster B 
(IA) 
17558558 c) HAVNET   99.6% (2/467nt diff) 
2017 Laos Cluster B 
(IA) 
17558559 HAVNET   100% (467 bp) 
2017 Laos Cluster B 
(IA) 
17558560 HAVNET   100% (467 bp) 
2017 Laos Cluster 
B (IA) Count 
9       
Table 4.17. Local BLAST results of the Laos outbreak Cluster B. Comparison between each 
sample and the cluster index case was shown. Y: index case c): Cluster B2 
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Sample 
ID 
Genotype 
CT 
Value 
Region 
Outbreak 
No 
Cluster 
17558538 IA 25.32 Xiengkhuang 1 A 
17558539 IA 28.7 Xiengkhuang 1 A 
17558540 IA 25.8 Xiengkhuang 2 A 
17558543 IA 28.85 Xiengkhuang 3 A 
17558545 IA 29.58 Xiengkhuang 1 A 
17558546 IA 30.63 Xiengkhuang 1 A 
17558547 IA 29.03 Xiengkhuang 1 A 
17558551 IA 28.13 Xiengkhuang 1 A 
17558541 IA 21.14 Xiengkhuang 1 A 
17558542 IA 18.28 Xiengkhuang 3 A 
17558544 IA 32.94 Xiengkhuang 1 A 
17558548 IA 29.07 Xiengkhuang 1 A 
17558549 IA 27.75 Xiengkhuang 1 A 
17558550 IA 27.4 Xiengkhuang 1 A 
17558554 IA 29.19 Vientiane Capital 4 B1 
17558557 IA 29.49 Vientiane Province 5 B2 
17558552 IA 25.78 Vientiane Capital 4 B1 
17558553 IA 32.53 Vientiane Capital 4 B1 
17558555 IA 26.86 Vientiane Capital 4 B1 
17558556 IA 39.41 Vientiane Province 5 B2 
17558558 IA 22.91 Vientiane Province 5 B2 
17558559 IA 35.51 Vientiane Province 5 B1 
17558560 IA 34.36 Vientiane Province 5 B1 
17558561 - 38.06 Vientiane Province 5 - 
Table 4.18. Comparison between epidemiological and molecular data 
The relationship between strains can also be seen on the phylogenetic tree. All samples were 
Genotype IA and could be clustered into two major clades. Cluster B were divided into two 
clusters, both of which showed a close relationship. Figure 4.8 shows the phylogenetic tree of 
the Laos outbreak samples. 
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Figure 4.8. Molecular phylogenetic analysis of the Laos samples. 
The phylogenetic tree was generated by using the Maximum Likelihood 
Method based on the Tamura model with 1000 bootstrap replicates. 
GBM-wt (GenBank accession no. X75215) is a reference sequence for 
HAV Genotype IA. HM-175-wt (GenBank accession no. M14707) is a 
reference sequence for HAV Genotype IB. 
 
4.6.5. HAV clusters with travel history to endemic countries 
One of the risk factors for HAV infection is travelling to an endemic country. Several of the 
clusters generated from the database were from patients that fall into this category. BLAST 
analysis using the database identified several samples which were related to previous cases and 
non-outbreak clusters. It showed that the 2015 Cluster C was related to HAV cases from 2016 
and 2017. Clinical notes of the 2015 patient (15581596) stated that the patient had a history of 
travel to Cambodia. Clinical notes of the other two patients showed similar travel history with 
the 2015 sample. The 2016 patient had a travel history to South East Asia and the 2017 patient 
had travelled to Singapore and Cambodia. BLAST analysis indicated that these recent patients 
were infected by HAV during their visit to South East Asian countries. 
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Cluster ID 
Sample 
ID 
Year Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match (compared 
to index) 
2015 Cluster C (IA) 15581596 2015 HAVNET Y  index  
2015 Cluster C (IA) 16579238 2016 HAVNET  99.8% (1/464nt diff) 
2015 Cluster C (IA) 17503347 2017 HAVNET   99.8% (1/464nt diff) 
2015 Cluster C (IA)   3       
Table 4.19. Local BLAST of HAV from patients with a travel history to Cambodia. Samples 
were collected from 2015, 2016 and 2017. Comparison between each sample and the index 
case is shown. Y: index case 
In June 2017, two Genotype IIIA samples were identified as being related to each other, with 
a two-nucleotide difference in sequence. These samples belonged to two patients who had 
recently returned to Australia. They were grouped within the same cluster, designated 2017 
Cluster B. Data from the NSW Department of Health staff identified the patients as returning 
travellers from Nepal. They had travelled separately and at different times. 
Cluster ID 
Sample 
ID 
Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match (compared to 
index) 
2017 Cluster B (IIIA) 17545006 HAVNET Y index 
2017 Cluster B (IIIA) 17548950 HAVNET   99.6% (2/464 nt diff) 
2017 Cluster B 
(IIIA) Count 
2       
Table 4.20. Local BLAST of patients with travel history to Nepal. Both samples were 
received in 2017. Y: index case 
In August 2017, BLAST analysis identified an HAV sequence from a sample which was 
identical with that from a previous sample. The sample 17556340 was grouped as a 
representative of 2014 Cluster A, and showed 100% identity with the index case of the cluster. 
The 2014 sample was from a patient returning from The Philippines. The DHHS confirmed 
that the other patient (Sample ID 17556340) had just returned from The Philippines.  
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Cluster ID 
Sample 
ID 
Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match (compared to 
index) 
2014 Cluster A (IA) 14534279 HAVNET Y index 
2014 Cluster A (IA) 17556340 HAVNET   100% 
2014 Cluster A 
(IA) Count 
2       
Table 4.21. Cluster of returning travellers from The Philippines. The patient sample 
(17556340) was from 2017, while the index case sample was isolated in 2015. Y: index case 
Another diagnostic sample also showed sequence similarity to a previous hepatitis A case. The 
sample from 2017 (17580910) showed a 99.5% identity with a sample from 2016 (16506549). 
Feedback from the NSW Department of Health suggested that both 17580910 and 16506549 
samples were from patients which had travel histories to The Philippines during their exposure 
periods. 
Cluster ID 
Sample 
ID 
Primers 
In 
Database 
% Match (compared to 
index) 
2017 Cluster E (IA) 16506549 HAVNET Y index 
2017 Cluster E (IA) 17580910 HAVNET   99.5% (1/440 nt diff) 
2017 Cluster E (IA) 
Count 
2       
Table 4.22. Patients with travel history to The Philippines. The index case was 2016 sample 
and the patient case was 2017 sample Y: index case 
 
4.7. Discussion 
In Part B, prospective testing was performed on samples sent to VIDRL for routine HAV 
diagnosis. There were 195 samples tested by nested RT-PCR assay using the HAVNET primer 
set, followed by Sanger sequencing. These samples were received between January 2016 and 
December 2017. Samples were initially tested by the RealStar HAV RNA RT-PCR assay at 
VIDRL to determine if they were HAV RNA-positive and the same extracted RNA was used 
for genotyping. Seven samples which were positive in the RealStar HAV assay were negative 
by the HAVNET nested PCR assay and six of the seven samples had CT (cycle threshold) 
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values > 35, which is usually a reflection of a low virus titer.79 One sample with a CT value of 
32 did not amplify in the nested PCR. A possible reason for this result could be inhibition 
during the PCR. The presence of substances in the clinical specimens or DNA/RNA extracts 
may inhibit the PCR reactions77,78 or a false-negative may result from genetic variations which 
prevent binding to one or both of the primers.78 Both possibilities seem unlikely, given that the 
sample was HAV RNA-positive in the screening assay which includes an internal control for 
each extracted sample. 
Part B of the project compared the sequences of 188 HAV RNA-positive diagnostic samples 
with each other and with the retrospective samples in the HAV sequence database. Results 
showed that some of the diagnostic cases had sequence similarity with the previous hepatitis A 
infections and some were related to each other. Of note, five samples received in 2017 showed 
100% identity to the index case of the 2015 frozen berries outbreak. This strongly suggested 
that the patients were infected by the same strain. Three samples received in 2016 from Western 
Australia also matched the index case of the frozen berries outbreak. However, these samples 
were collected in late 2015 or early 2016 and were most probably part of the original 2015 
outbreak. The five 2017 samples represented new HAV infection cases, but they were linked 
to the same HAV strain which caused the 2015 mixed frozen berries outbreak. 
The HAV database also identified several clusters between 2016 and 2017. One cluster, 
designated the Christmas outbreak, was identified in early 2017. The infections were suspected 
to have occurred around Christmas 2016 in a family. Epidemiological data revealed that the 
index case had returned from Fiji, which has a high prevalence of hepatitis A. Another cluster 
was identified in 2017 which involved two different families. It was called the R family 
outbreak where all of the cases were a 100% match with the index case and with each other. 
This outbreak was interesting as it appeared there was an initial hepatitis A infection spread 
within a young family, transmitted to a babysitter who in turn transmitted the virus to the young 
children of another family. While the advantages of the molecular epidemiology are clear in 
such instances, a link may not be found in all cases. In one cluster identified in Seymour during 
2017, two sample sequences were shown to have 100% identity with each other. Unfortunately, 
the DHHS could find no common risk factor shared by each patient. 
The database was also able to identify local HAV strains linked to international HAV 
outbreaks. The large outbreak in Europe was predominantly associated with the MSM 
population.83 Sequencing showed it to be HAV Genotype IA and phylogenetic analysis 
 115 
 
revealed that the cases could be grouped into three genetically-related clusters of infection. The 
first linked Australian case was identified in mid-2017 from a Victorian sample. It was a 100% 
match with the index case (RIVM-HAV16-090) from Cluster 2 of the EU MSM outbreaks. In 
the next few months, several further cases were identified which could be genetically linked to 
all three EU clusters. 
There were 66 local cases identified to December 2017 related to the EU MSM outbreaks. 
These cases were isolated from patients from NSW, Victoria and South Australia. Local 
BLAST database searches showed that all sequences were similar, if not identical, to the EU 
index cases and this was confirmed by phylogenetic analysis. The phylogenetic tree of the 
Australian cases (Figure 4.6) showed a similar pattern to the phylogenetic tree of the European 
cases (Figure 4.9).  
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Figure 4.9. Phylogenetic tree of the EU MSM outbreak83 
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Besides source investigation of hepatitis A infections in Australian, the database was also used 
for investigating outbreak samples from Laos PDR. As a WHO hepatitis reference laboratory, 
VIDRL received serum samples from Laos for diagnostic confirmation of HAV infection and 
genotyping. Using the RealStar assay, 24/24 serum samples were shown to be HAV RNA-
positive, with 23 samples giving a positive nested RT-PCR with the HAVNET primers and one 
a negative result. The RealStar assay result for the negative sample had a high CT value (38.06) 
which suggested that the result was probably due to a low virus titre. 
The genotyping assay identified the 23 positive samples as being Genotype IA. BLAST 
analysis showed they could be divided into two clusters, A and B. There were 14 cases in 
Cluster A and nine cases in Cluster B. This outcome was in contrast to the results of the Laos 
epidemiological investigations, which indicated that there were possibly five outbreaks. The 
molecular investigations showed that Outbreaks 1, 2 and 3 were associated with Cluster A, 
while Outbreaks 4 and 5 were associated with Cluster B. All cluster A cases showed 99% 
identity with the HAV strain with GenBank accession no. KX151468, and Cluster B cases had 
99% identity with EF207320. The local BLAST database analysis revealed that two samples 
in Cluster B had two nucleotide differences from the other Cluster B samples. Therefore, 
Cluster B was divided into Cluster B1 and Cluster B2. GenBank HAV strain EF207320, which 
showed homology to the outbreak in Vientiane (Cluster B), was a strain isolated from HAV 
outbreaks in Thailand during 2001 – 2005. As the Laos capital Vientiane and its surrounding 
province share a border with Thailand, it was likely that the outbreaks in Vientiane were caused 
by the HAV strain from Thailand. 
The database was able to identify the relationship between the recent and past HAV infections. 
Two sequences from HAV RNA-positive samples from 2016 and 2017 showed high homology 
with the sequence of an HAV RNA-positive sample from 2015 (2015 Cluster C). Clinical notes 
of the patients indicated that they were returned travellers from South East Asian countries. 
The 2015 patient had a travel history to Cambodia, the 2016 patient travelled to South East 
Asia without further information supplied about the country visited; the 2017 patient was a 
returned traveller from Singapore and Cambodia. 
In June 2017, the HAV sequences of two different samples showed high homology (99.6% 
identity) with two nucleotide differences (2017 Cluster B). Clinical notes indicated that both 
patients had a history of travel to Nepal even though the DHHS confirmed that the patients 
travelled separately and at different times. This suggested that both patients acquired HAV 
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infections during their stay in Nepal. Similarly, another result from an isolate in 2017 showed 
similarity with a cluster from samples acquired in 2014 (2014 Cluster A). The cluster consisted 
of returned travellers from The Philippines. The DHHS confirmed that the 2017 patient had 
also recently returned from The Philippines. It can be deduced that the 2017 patient acquired 
HAV infection from the same common source as the other visitors. Besides those three clusters, 
another cluster identified similarity between a 2017 sample with a sample from 2016. 
Epidemiological data described that both patients were traveller to The Philippines. This data 
supported the molecular investigation which showed similarity between both samples.  
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
HAV infection remains one of the major hazards to public health, causing significant morbidity 
globally. The WHO estimates that there are at least 1.5 million reported cases annually but 
hepatitis A likely affects 120 million people every year, predominantly in developing 
countries.84 HAV infection is not associated with a high mortality but the disease can be severe, 
and can place a high economic burden on countries due to direct medical costs and losses in 
productivity.40 Clusters of infection can also occur in developed countries, with two notable 
hepatitis A outbreaks being reported in Europe and the USA, respectively, during 2017.  The 
European Union (EU) outbreak mostly affected men who have sex with men (MSM). Between 
June 1, 2016 and June 26, 2017, 1,500 confirmed hepatitis A cases were reported by 16 EU 
countries.47 The other significant outbreak was reported in the County of San Diego, USA. The 
outbreak started in early 2017 and as of November 8, 2017, there were 574 cases, with 372 
hospitalised and 20 deaths. Most of those infected were homeless and/or had a risk factor of 
injecting drug use, although some had neither risk factor. The most probable transmission route 
was through person-to-person contact because no common food, beverages or drugs were 
identified that may have contributed to this outbreak, although investigations are still 
ongoing.85 
Hepatitis A transmission occurs most commonly through the faecal-oral route, either by 
person-to-person contact, or the ingestion of HAV contaminated food or water.2 Investigations 
of many large outbreaks have shown that the source of the infection has often been food 
contaminated by an asymptomatic infected food handler or contaminated water that has 
allowed HAV to get into the food chain. This transmission pattern has the potential to turn a 
local outbreak into a global problem because many foods are exported rapidly around the 
world. In addition, food industries commonly have their fresh produce supplied by countries 
with high hepatitis A endemicity. Furthermore, the standard method of microbiology quality 
control is often insufficient to detect the presence of virus on food.56 
Identifying the source of HAV food borne outbreaks is difficult. The most common method 
used for investigating the outbreak source relies on an epidemiological investigation using a 
questionnaire to identify risk factors.67 Tracing the source of outbreaks can be problematic due 
to the long incubation period of the virus (15-50 days) leading to difficulties in obtaining 
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implicated food products for testing (which may have been consumed or discarded) and for 
patients to recall all foods consumed or other risk factors during the window period. This 
reliance on recall can also lead to a bias in answering any questionnaire.2 In the case of 
suspected food, even though some may be available for testing, facilities that are certified for 
testing of HAV in both clinical and food samples are scant. Another problem is that suspected 
food may not contain sufficient virus to be detected in the available assays.  
One of the solutions to identifying an outbreak source is sequencing selected regions of the 
HAV genome to determine the genetic relatedness of isolates. During the 2009 semi-dried 
tomatoes outbreak, CSIRO suggested the establishment of a facility which would be certified 
to test for HAV in both clinical and food samples. This laboratory would be capable of 
genotyping and sequencing to identify links between implicated product and clinical cases.56 
To date, no such laboratory has been created in Australia. 
The current research project entailed amplifying HAV RNA by using specific primer sets 
designed by HAVNET. These were international consensus primers which are used worldwide, 
primarily by the countries working under the HAV network (hence the designation HAVNET). 
The use of these specific primers allows the sharing of HAV sequence data for international 
mapping and source tracing.72 The HAVNET protocol been used during recent outbreaks, such 
as with the 2017 EU MSM outbreak.47 
This project’s aims were to genotype HAV RNA-positive samples which had been received 
and shown to have detectable HAV by VIDRL. The genotyping assay included nested RT-PCR 
and Sanger sequencing using the HAVNET protocol, designed by the global network of 
scientists from hepatitis A reference laboratories. The project was divided into two parts (A 
and B). Part A involved the retrospective testing of HAV RNA positive samples acquired from 
the VIDRL sample bank from the period of 2010-2015. The samples had been previously tested 
for HAV RNA using an in-house method and any genotyping and sequencing had been 
performed using these same primers deduced from the HAV VP1/P2A junction. The PCR 
product generated was considerably smaller than the product generated from the HAVNET 
primers.  In the project Part B, samples collected prospectively were tested for HAV RNA 
using the real-time RealStar HAV RT-PCR assay and HAV RNA-positive samples were 
sequenced and genotyped using the HAVNET protocol. 
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5.1. Hepatitis A Virus Genotyping Assay – Retrospective Testing  
The aim of Part A was to retrospectively genotype 130 samples which had been shown to be 
HAV RNA-positive by the in-house nested RT-PCR. Among the 130 samples, 94 had been 
previously genotyped using the VIDRL in-house primer set. The HAVNET primer set is 
designed to amplify the VP1/P2A junction of the HAV genome. Other regions of the HAV 
genome have been used for genotyping, such as the C terminus of the VP3 region; the N 
terminus of the VP1 region; the VP1-P2B region and the entire VP1 region. However, there is 
little evidence that any one of these regions is best suited for genotyping. HAVNET selected 
the VP1/P2A junction for their primer design because there was a significant amount of 
sequence data already available for this region which would allow more comprehensive 
sequence comparisons.73 The VIDRL in-house primer set was deduced from the junction of the 
VP1/P2A region of the HAV genome which is the same region used by the HAVNET primer. 
However, the VIDRL in-house primer set only amplifies 233 nt of the region.74 The fragment 
is shorter than HAVNET primer which amplifies 520 nt of the region.73  
Based on the study by Vaughan et al.,80 the use of subgenomic regions in determining genetic 
relatedness among HAV strains is suboptimal. Their analyses of several phylogenetic tree of 
different subgenomic regions showed inconsistency. This inconsistency may have occurred in 
the comparison between HAVNET genotyping and VIDRL in-house genotyping which 
showed four differences in 94 of the HAV genotypes. However, the genotype differences were 
most likely caused by a sample mix up during the multiple laboratory steps because although 
there is substantial difference in the size of the PCR product, both primers overlap the same 
region.  
 
5.2. Establishment of a Hepatitis A Virus Sequence Database 
All HAV sequences obtained from the 2010 - 2015 patient samples were stored using the 
Geneious software platform, which also has a collection of bioinformatic tools for subsequent 
molecular and epidemiological data analysis. 
Phylogenetic analysis of the 130 HAV sequences identified 24 genetically-related clusters. The 
two largest clusters were sequences from the 2009 semi-dried tomato outbreak and the 2015 
frozen berries outbreak, which consisted of 19 and 17 sequences, respectively. Much larger 
numbers of samples had been previously linked in both outbreaks at VIDRL, but it was not 
necessary to confirm the HAV genotype of all samples for the purpose of establishing the HAV 
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genotype database. In the semi-dried tomato cluster, the sequence from the original index case 
which had been amplified using the VIDRL in-house primer set (OD1 primers) was used 
because no further samples were available for genotyping using the HAVNET primers. Twelve 
HAVNET sequences showed one nucleotide difference, and one sequence showed two 
nucleotide differences from the index case. The differences in the semi-dried tomato cluster 
between the HAVNET sequences and the index case were probably due to the use of different 
primer sets bringing about some bias. As shown in a study by Vaughan et al.,80 comparisons of 
different subgenomic regions did not match completely. 80 For the 2015 frozen berries cluster, 
the HAVNET sequence was available for the index case. Multiple sequence alignment of the 
17 HAV sequences in this outbreak showed most of the samples were identical to the index 
case, with only one sample showing a single nucleotide difference.  
Besides the two large outbreaks, phylogenetic analysis showed there were another 22 smaller 
clusters, most of which were made up of two or three sequences. From limited clinical 
information, it appeared that most of these clusters consisted of cases that were geographically 
related, were among family members and their close contacts and patients with a common 
travel history to endemic countries. The full extent of one cluster, comprising 11 sequences 
(2010 Cluster A), had not been previously recognised. Three family members from country 
Victoria were known to have genetic links but the cluster also included three cases from 
metropolitan Melbourne, four cases from Sydney and another case from a different region of 
country Victoria. Transmission by close personal contact would be an unlikely explanation 
considering the extent of the outbreak and a food product may have played some role. 
 
5.3. Hepatitis A Virus Genotyping Assay – Prospective Testing and Source Investigation 
Infection with HAV remains a major public health problem. It is a virus that can be easily 
transmitted; it is hardy, being able to survive passage through the gastrointestinal tract and 
virus shedding in stool peaks before symptoms appear, which enhances person-to-person 
spread and contamination of food by food handlers. High risk population groups also include 
MSM, injecting drug users, and those who travel to endemic regions.2,42 Although hepatitis A 
infections are usually self-limited, they can cause fulminant hepatitis in the elderly especially 
those with underlying liver diseases.2 Importantly, HAV can cause large community wide 
outbreaks which can quickly lead to public health problems and incur high expenses.40 
Therefore, rapid identification of an infection source is critical to limit the spread of infection.  
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The most common method for linking an infection source to an outbreak is by an 
epidemiological investigation.59,65 In Australia, hepatitis A is a notifiable disease and a spike 
in notifications may trigger a case-control study to generate an odds-ratio that links any risk 
association with the illness.65 While this can provide strong epidemiological evidence of a link 
between the outbreak and the source, the long incubation period of HAV can make the recall 
of risk association difficult, particularly in the case of food. Similarly, a spike in reporting may 
indicate a group with a common risk factor (e.g. travel, MSM, etc) but does not necessarily 
provide evidence of a common source. With the advances in molecular testing and in silico 
analysis, new HAV sequences from patient samples can be rapidly compared and against all 
previously diagnosed HAV cases and their level of genetic relatedness calculated.   
The current project used a combination of molecular techniques and bioinformatics tools, in 
conjunction with available patient epidemiological data, to investigate the source of hepatitis 
A infections. The advantage of the project was the use of HAVNET primer set, the international 
consensus primers. This allowed the local HAV sequences to be compared with HAV 
sequences which had been made available from other countries. This advantage was 
demonstrated during the 2017 EU MSM outbreaks. Based on HAVNET genotyping, three 
different clusters were identified among approximately 1500 confirmed cases from 16 EU 
countries.47,86 
The comparison between the current diagnostic samples and the HAV sequence database was 
able to identify similar sequences with the 2015 mixed frozen berries outbreak strain. Five 
sequences of the 2017 samples were identical with the index case of the frozen berries outbreak. 
Sequence analyses of those five 2017 diagnostic samples led to a public health alert being 
issued by DHHS along with a voluntary product recall of the frozen berries (Appendix I). The 
health alert circulated on June 2nd, 2017 stated that a hepatitis A outbreak had been identified. 
The outbreak was potentially related to the consumption of a particular batch of frozen mixed 
berries in 300 g packs, which had been recalled as a precaution.87 Moreover, the authorities 
suspected that the frozen berries product came from the same industrial plant and in the same 
time frame as the berries associated with the 2015 frozen berries outbreak.88  
In order to confirm the infection source, frozen berry specimens were sent to VIDRL for 
testing. The samples came as RNA extract specimens. They were tested using the RealStar 
HAV assay and the nested RT-PCR assay. Unfortunately, all samples were negative by both 
assays, due possibly to a low virus titer in the specimens. Another less likely possibility was 
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that neither assay was designed to detect HAV RNA in non-clinical samples, the RealStar and 
HAVNET nested RT-PCR assay having been optimised for testing of human samples.73,89 
The most common route of transmission for HAV is person-to-person contact. A study by 
Mbithi et al42 has shown that HAV can survive for at least 4 h on human hands (specifically 
finger pads) and thus the virus has the potential to be transmitted to other persons or inanimate 
surfaces and cause infection for an extended period. This is most likely where it occurs in 
households and other close contacts of infected individuals. In a hypothetical scenario, Mbithi 
et al.42 proposed how a childcare worker could be infected by changing the diaper of an 
asymptomatic child. If that person was also involved in food handling, then he/she could 
transmit the virus to other susceptible children, who in turn could infect household contacts.42 
This route of transmission was demonstrated by two cluster, the Christmas outbreak and R 
family outbreak. In these clusters, the viruses were transmitted among family members. The 
HAV was also transmitted to a different family by a person who had contact with both families. 
It showed by the R family outbreak, which a baby sitter transmitted the virus from a family to 
another. A person can also get infected by visiting countries which are endemic for hepatitis 
A. In many developing countries, hygiene and sanitation conditions are inadequate2 and this 
fits the situation of the index case of the 2016 Christmas outbreak who most likely was infected 
during a visit to Fiji. 
In 2016, HAV outbreaks occurred in Europe, which related to the MSM population. It consists 
of three different clusters of HAV Genotype IA and VIDRL acquired the sequences of all the 
index cases. Those sequences were also uploaded to the HAV sequence database. The database 
identified the first case among Australian with the sequence related to Cluster 2 of the EU 
MSM outbreaks. Based on epidemiological data from the DHHS, the patient had just returned 
from Italy and had history of MSM exposure. Without the molecular investigation it would 
have taken some time to identify this important link.  
Approximately one month later, another new case showed a genetic relatedness with V16-
39450 Ber/UK, which is the index case from Cluster 1 of the EU MSM outbreak. Following 
this sample identification, as of December 2017, a total of 38 samples have shown high 
sequence homology with the EU Cluster 1 outbreak; most of the local cases show a 99.6% (2 
of 460 nucleotides different) identity with index-1 (V16-39450) of the EU MSM Cluster 1. 
Another index case, 17562098, was used to represent these genetic variants of Cluster 1. 
Overall, there were 31/38 samples showing a 100% identity with the index-2 of the cluster. 
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Two other index cases, designated index-3 and index-4, showed 99.8% (1 of 460 nucleotides 
different) and 99.3% (3 nucleotides different) identity with the EU MSM index-1, respectively.  
The patient details showed that the strain which was responsible for this cluster was not 
confined to the cases with the risk factor of MSM. The patient 17567083 was a female and 
there was also evidence of transmission through family contact, as demonstrated by samples 
from 17559089 and 17562098, one the parent of the other. The epidemiological data revealed 
that the age of the infected patients ranged from 21 to 70 years old and the great majority of 
cases in the cluster were located in NSW, with one isolate from a Victorian patient collected in 
November 2017 and another four from patients from South Australia in December 2017. 
In Cluster 2 of the MSM outbreak, there were 19 patients related to the strain RIVM-HAV16-
090 from the EU MSM outbreak. The sequences showed a 100% identity with the index case 
of this cluster. The DHHS epidemiological data identified that the first case had travelled to 
Italy and had a history of MSM exposure. Like Cluster 1, most cases in Cluster 2 were largely 
confined to the one State, Victoria, but in November one case was identified in South Australia.  
The first case with a genetic link to Cluster 3 of the EU MSM outbreak was identified in early 
May and showed 100% identity with the index case, V16-25801. As of December 2017, eight 
more local cases were linked to Cluster 3 of the EU MSM outbreak. The case coded 17576280 
showed 99.8% (1 of 459 nucleotides different) identity with the index case, while the other 
cases were 100% match with the index case. The clinical notes showed that case 17576280 
came from South Australia and the others from Victoria. The epidemiological data showed that 
each representative of the respective MSM outbreak clusters found in Australia was originally 
confined to a different State, but isolates were later found outside the region where it was first 
identified. Based on the chronology of the samples, it was possible that the viruses were spread 
by one or other of the cases visiting interstate. However, as the HAV strains appear to have 
originated in Europe, it is also possible that the patients from the other States may have been 
infected independently if they visited Europe. Those individuals infected with the two 
nucleotides variant of the EU MSM Cluster 1 were most likely to have acquired the infection 
in Australia though, rather than in Europe. A further epidemiological investigation is needed 
to clarify the transmission pattern of the infection. The information generated from this 
investigation contributed to the DHHS issuing a public health alert to health professionals of 
an outbreak of hepatitis A in adults, many of who were MSM (Appendix II). 
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The molecular investigation was also useful for investigating HAV outbreaks in Laos PDR. It 
was able to specify five suspected outbreaks into only two specific outbreaks. Based on 
epidemiological investigation, five outbreaks were suspected occurred in Xienkhuang 
province, and Vientiane province and capital. However, molecular investigation revealed there 
were only two strains causing the outbreaks. The combined results from the molecular 
investigations and epidemiological investigations identified that each strain was confined to a 
specific region. The GenBank HAV strain linked to Cluster A (KX151468) was isolated among 
patients from Xienkhuang province. The GenBank HAV strain linked to Cluster B (EF207320) 
was isolated from patients who came from the Laos capital, Vientiane and the surrounding 
province. Further investigations of the HAV strain listed with the GenBank accession number 
KX151468 showed that it was associated with an outbreak among MSM in Taiwan in 2015. 
GenBank HAV strain EF207320 was a strain isolated from HAV outbreaks in Thailand and it 
was likely that the outbreaks in Vientiane were caused by this strain being transmitted via their 
shared border. Unfortunately, epidemiological data about the outbreaks in Xienkhuang 
province were not available. There is anecdotal evidence that students from Taiwan do visit 
the Xienkhuang province, but no further information could link the outbreaks. Figure 5.1 shows 
the geographical positions of the Xienkhuang province, and Vientiane province and the Capital, 
Vientiane.  
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Figure 5.1. Laos People’s Democratic Republic90 
A: Xienkhuang province where the Cluster A cases were located 
B: Vientiane Capital and Province where the Cluster B cases were located 
The molecular database was also useful for source investigation among non-outbreak related 
cases. Four clusters were identified by the database and none of them had relationship with 
HAV outbreaks. The only identified risk factor among these clusters was travel history to HAV 
endemic countries. Each cluster showed that the current diagnostic samples were similar with 
the index case and epidemiological data revealed that the index case and the patients had travel 
histories to the same specific countries.  
Travelling to HAV endemic countries is one of the most common risk factors for acquiring 
hepatitis A.2 Approximately 10% of hepatitis A patients in developed countries were infected 
during their travel to endemic countries. The source of infections can be confirmed by 
comparing the sequence of the patient isolates, which would be similar to the circulating strains 
from the endemic countries.19 In this project, the origin of the hepatitis A infections was 
confirmed by identifying similarity with previous cases which had a common travel history. It 
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showed that the molecular database was useful to determine the transmission pattern of HAV. 
Those four clusters supported that travelling to HAV endemic countries is one of the common 
risk factors of hepatitis A infection.  Therefore, a person from non-endemic countries should 
consider HAV vaccination prior to travel to endemic countries. 
 
5.4. Summary and Future Studies 
The results generated in this project indicated that the most common HAV genotype among 
VIDRL samples was Genotype IA. This is consistent with previous studies which have 
identified HAV Genotype IA as the most dominant genotype isolated from humans. The data 
strongly supports that the HAVNET consensus primer set should be used by all laboratories 
performing molecular diagnostics for HAV. It can minimise differences in genotyping leading 
to increased accuracy in tracing strains of HAV involved in outbreaks, both locally and 
internationally.65 For infection source investigation, a combination of epidemiological and 
molecular investigations provides the greatest advantages. During the project, analysis of the 
molecular database was able to identify a recent frozen berries outbreak which was related to 
the 2015 outbreak. The findings led to the issue of an Australia-wide public health alert and 
voluntary product recall. The database also identified imported HAV from outbreaks in Europe 
which were associated with MSM. Three clusters, consistent with the HAV strains found in 
Europe, were identified among Australian patients, which also led to the issue of an Australia-
wide public health alert. 
Besides being valuable for tracing HAV from Australian samples, the project was useful for 
identifying HAV strains that were responsible for outbreaks in Laos PDR. Epidemiological 
investigations indicated that five outbreaks occurred between 2016 and 2017, but molecular 
investigations showed that only two HAV strains caused the outbreaks. Furthermore, sequence 
comparisons found that one of the strains was related to an outbreak strain from a neighbouring 
country. These results showed that molecular investigations can identify epidemiological links 
that are not evident by traditional epidemiological investigations. 
The molecular investigations were also useful in determining the source of infections among 
non-outbreak related cases. This was demostrated by the confirmation of cases with travel 
history to hepatitis A-endemic countries. In summary, the establishment of a molecular 
database can simplify source investigation of HAV outbreaks and identify related strains with 
previously unknown epidemiological associations. 
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The work presented here makes a strong case that molecular epidemiology plays a critical role 
in suspected HAV outbreak investigations and should be considered as part of the standard 
workup in such circumstances. Nevertheless, it should not exclude standard and proven 
epidemiological approaches but should be seen as complementary. Real-time monitoring of 
local circulating HAV strains can inform public health authorities of a potential outbreak and 
enable interventions, such as vaccination or product recalls, and limit transmission before the 
results from traditional epidemiological investigations are available. Without sequence 
analysis, the transmission of the EU MSM outbreak strains may have been seen as a single 
HAV outbreak in Australia, which could have made source tracing and subsequent public 
health intervention measures problematic. Similarly, the molecular analysis of the HAV 
showed that the outbreaks in Laos, which appeared to originate from several sources, were 
likely to have originated from only two. 
The use of the HAVNET consensus primer set should also be considered standard. There is 
merit in having a database of local circulating HAV strains, but this information should also 
be made available through the international HAVNET database, so that the overseas hepatitis 
A scientific community can identify any genetic links.  
There is much to commend a molecular approach to hepatitis A epidemiology and there is a 
need for further studies. What is the significance of a one or two nucleotide difference in a 
HAV sequence compared to an index case? The largest of the local outbreaks with a genetic 
link to the EU MSM Cluster 1 was caused by a virus with a two nucleotides difference from 
the overseas index case. Did this strain change in a single patient due to selection pressure and 
subsequently remain stable in the other transmission cases? Was there an antecedent HAV 
strain which both the EU MSM Cluster 1 and the related local variant evolved from? 
Finally, molecular technology is rapidly evolving. It will soon become possible to use Next 
Generation Sequencing to generate data from larger genomic fragments, if not the full genome 
of HAV. Although an RNA virus, the viral genome is well conserved and whole genome 
sequencing has already been performed using traditional methods and shown to more 
accurately reflect genetic relatedness. 
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